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Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Risikomanagement ist von grundlegender Bedeutung für die Förderung wirtschaft-
licher Entwicklung. Ein effektives Risikomanagement kann die Auswirkungen ne-
gativer Schocks verringern und Stabilität auf allen Gesellschaftsebenen schaffen.
Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung erfordert darüber hinaus, Chancen zu ergreifen, die
Fortschritt ermöglichen, aber auch Risiken mit sich bringen. Risikomanagement
ist folglich ein wichtiges Instrument, um die Not der Menschen in Entwicklungs-
und Schwellenländern zu verringern und wachsenden Wohlstand zu ermöglichen.
Dies gilt insbesondere für die Bevölkerung im ländlichen Nordosten Thailands, der
Region, die in dieser Dissertation untersucht wird. Die dortige Bevölkerung ist
größtenteils arm oder von Armut bedroht und gleichzeitig mit einer Vielzahl von
Risiken konfrontiert. Unerwartete Ereignisse können für diese Menschen drama-
tische Folgen haben. Ferner sind sie aufgrund ihres Lebensstandards eher dazu
geneigt, auf riskante, jedoch möglicherweise profitable Investitionen zu verzichten.
Diese Dissertation trägt dazu bei, besser zu verstehen, wie Risikomanagement
das Entwicklungspotenzial der Menschen im ländlichen Thailand stärken kann.
Die Forschungsprojekte befassen sich mit unterschiedlichen Aspekten des Risiko-
managements  vom individuellen Entscheidungsprozess über die Funktionsweise
von Mikroversicherungen bis hin zu den Auswirkungen einer Sozialversicherung
auf Kinder. Die Dissertation beschreibt mögliche Hindernisse für das Risikoma-
nagement und gibt Beispiele für Institutionen und Politikmaßnahmen, die armen
oder armutsgefährdeten Menschen erfolgreich finanzielle Absicherung bieten. Die
Arbeit beinhaltet einen Ausblick auf künftige Herausforderungen, Gefahren für
bestehende Finanzinstitutionen und mögliche Auswirkungen von Politikmaßnah-
men.
Die Dissertation beinhaltet drei zentrale Ergebnisse. In Kapitel 2 wird zunächst
gezeigt, dass Menschen im ländlichen Thailand dazu neigen, inkonsistente Entschei-
dungen unter Risiko zu treffen, die ein Hindernis für das Risikomanagement dar-
stellen können. Kapitel 3 thematisiert eine der wenigen Institutionen, die im
ländlichen Thailand Versicherungsschutz anbieten. Diese Abhandlung trägt dazu
bei, die Funktionsweise und Stabilität der Versicherung besser zu verstehen und
hebt Herausforderungen für deren künftige wirtschaftliche Tragfähigkeit hervor.
Kapitel 4 befasst sich schließlich mit einer weiteren Institution, die Menschen im
ländlichen Thailand finanzielle Absicherung bietet: die staatliche Rente. Diese
2Abhandlung leistet einen Beitrag zur Literatur über die Auswirkungen staatlicher
Rentensysteme, die über die eigentlichen Leistungsempfänger hinausgehen. Es
wird gezeigt, dass Kinder bezüglich Schulbildung und Erwerbstätigkeit von Renten-
leistungen ihrer Großeltern profitieren. In gewisser Weise knüpft dieser Essay an
Kapitel 2 an, da diese Kinder aufgrund ihrer besseren Schulbildung möglicherweise
weniger Inkonsistenzen in ihrem Entscheidungsverhalten aufzeigen.
Schlagwörter: Allais-Paradoxon, Versicherung, Rente, Kindeswohl, Thailand
English Summary
Risk management is of great importance for economic development. Effective risk
management can reduce the impact of adverse events and build resilience at any
level of society. Moreover, development requires taking advantage of opportunities
for improvement that usually do not come without risk. Risk management is
thus an essential tool in order to prevent hardship and enhance the well-being of
people in developing and emerging countries. This is particularly the case for rural
Northeast Thailand, the region studied in this dissertation. People in the region are
mostly poor or vulnerable to falling into poverty, while being exposed to a variety
of risks. For them, risky events can have dramatic consequences. Given their
economic status, they may forego profitable but risky investment opportunities.
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of how risk management may
enhance the potential for development of people in rural Thailand. The re-
search projects address different aspects of risk management  from the individual
decision-making process to the functioning of microinsurance schemes and the im-
pact of social insurance on children. The dissertation discusses potential obstacles
to risk management and examples of institutions and policies that successfully
provide financial protection to the poor and vulnerable. It includes an outlook
on future challenges, threats to existing financial institutions and potential policy
implications.
There are three main conclusions from this dissertation. First, Chapter 2 demon-
strates that people in rural Thailand tend to make inconsistent decisions under
risk which may potentially be an obstacle to risk management. Chapter 3 presents
one of the few institutions that provide insurance in rural Thailand: funeral insur-
ance associations. This essay contributes to the understanding of the functioning
and the stability of the insurance scheme and highlights challenges for its future
financial viability. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses another institution that provides
financial protection to the people in rural Thailand: the social pension scheme.
The essay contributes to the literature on the impact of public pension schemes
that goes beyond the beneficiaries of the schemes. It provides evidence that chil-
dren benefit from the pension income of their grandparents with regard to school
enrollment and the employment status. In some way, this essay links back to
Chapter 2, as we would expect better educated children to make more consistent
decisions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In recent years, growing attention by researchers and practicioners was given to
the importance of risk management for boosting economic development. The topic
is high on the agenda of policy-makers and international organizations which is
exemplified by the 2014 World Development Report on Risk and Opportunity.
As the title suggests, the relevance for development is twofold. On the one hand,
effective risk management can reduce the impact of adverse events and build re-
silience at any level of society. On the other hand, development requires taking
advantage of opportunities for improvement that usually do not come without
risk. The identification of risks and an effective management thereof are thus es-
sential in order to prevent hardship, improve the living standards, and enhance
the well-being of people in developing and emerging countries.
Addressing risk management and its potential for development is of particular im-
portance in the context of rural Thailand which is the focus of this dissertation.
Substantial parts of the rural Thai population are either poor or vulnerable to
falling into poverty. Because most of them are subsistence farmers, they are ex-
posed to a variety of systemic and idiosyncratic risks such as the loss of harvest
due to flooding or drought, volatility of prices of agricultural inputs and produce,
or the illness of a family member. In fear of such events, poor and vulnerable peo-
ple may refrain from undertaking actions that could bring improvements but also
risks, such as the investment in agricultural machinery or other farm equipment
that may enhance productivity at the farm level.
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of how risk management may
1
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enhance the potential for development in rural Thailand. The research projects ad-
dress different aspects of risk management  from the individual decision-making
process to the functioning of microinsurance schemes and the impact of social
insurance on children. The analyses, thus, involve the individual, household, in-
stitutional and state level. The dissertation discusses potential obstacles to risk
management and examples of institutions and policies that successfully provide
financial protection to the poor and vulnerable. It includes an outlook on future
challenges, threats to existing financial institutions and potential policy implica-
tions.
The research projects that are part of this dissertation are based on household
survey data collected by members of the research unit FOR 756 "Vulnerability in
Southeast Asia" which was funded by the German Research Foundation. The sur-
vey was carried out in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2013. Households in Northeast Thai-
land were interviewed, particularly in the province of Buriram, Nakhon Phanom
and Ubon Ratchathani. The sample is representative for the rural population of
the selected provinces.
In Chapter 2, the first essay investigates potential obstacles to risk management
which may arise out of inconsistent decision making under risk. Here, risk man-
agement is addressed from the perspective of risk-taking in the pursue of oppor-
tunities rather than looking at reducing the impact of adverse events. The focus
of this essay is on decision making with information on outcomes and correspond-
ing probabilities given, i.e. the choice between risky lotteries. More precisely, we
address Allais-type behavior  a particular pattern of inconsistent behavior which
may capture suboptimal decision making in general. We study the incidence of
Allais-type behavior with survey respondents in Ubon Ratchathani in 2010. Our
empirical results show that more than half of the respondents in our sample are
prone to Allais-type behavior which is a relatively high share compared to ear-
lier studies, mostly from developed countries. Moreover, we find that individuals
with greater general and math-related ability are less prone to this particular type
of inconsistent behavior. Finally, our results suggest that Allais-type behavior is
more pronounced among dynamic individuals with higher risk tolerance and more
optimism. We interpret our findings as evidence that people in developing and
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emerging countries may face more difficulties in (consistent) decision making. Fos-
tering abilities (e.g. by improving educational outcomes) could be one option in
order to achieve more consistent behavior.
Chapter 3 turns to investigating risk management as an instrument to reduce the
negative impact of risks. The focus of this essay is on a popular institution that
provides insurance in rural Thailand: funeral aid associations (FAAs). The death
of a family member is a major risk for households in rural Thailand. Owing to
social norms, families are compelled to arrange costly funeral ceremonies. FAAs
provide financial protection by offering insurance that covers funeral expenses of
the insured. In this chapter, we investigate the stability of FAAs. This is a highly
interesting feature given that FAAs have no strict entry regulations and refrain
from any kind of risk pricing (i.e. insurance is offered at a uniform price). Al-
though theory predicts that in such a setting, individuals with a higher mortality
risk would demand more insurance, thereby deteriorating the risk pool and poten-
tially destabilizing the scheme, FAAs seem to be remarkably stable. We show that
high-risk individuals (in particular older people and men) are indeed more likely
to be insured. However, this deterioration in the quality of the risk pool seems
to be partly balanced by married individuals who appear to have a greater pref-
erence for insurance at lower risk levels. Altruism or reciprocity could be among
the motivations for married individuals to demand insurance, however we cannot
show this empirically. Irrespective of the underlying motive, this preference-driven
demand is highly important for the future financial viability of the scheme. Once
alternative providers offer funeral insurance in the region using risk-based pricing,
they may attract particularly those low-risk individuals with a high preference for
insurance (e.g. married individuals), as for them coverage would be cheaper. This,
in turn, may threaten the stability of FAAs. In order to preserve their financial
stability in the future, FAAs may consider to establish a simple pricing scheme
based, e.g., on age and gender.
Finally, Chapter 4 investigates another instrument which might prevent people in
rural Thailand from financial hardship: the public pension scheme. The scheme
provides pension benefits of rather small size in order to protect people against
poverty in the old age. Although non-contributory, all eldery in the country are
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eligible for pension since the reform of the scheme in 2009. This is in contrast
to the previous system which only targeted the poorest elderly. The essay in-
vestigates whether pensioners share their benefits with other family members, in
particular with their grandchildren. We exploit the changes due to the pension
reform in order to estimate the impact of the universal pension on school enroll-
ment and the employment status of children. We find that children who live with
beneficiaries of the reform are more likely to be enrolled in school and less likely to
work relative to children in households that were unaffected by the reform. How-
ever, schooling seems to improve only for boys who live with male beneficiaries,
whereas reductions in employment appear to be limited to girls in households with
female pensioners. These findings may be interpreted as evidence for differential
preferences of grandmothers and grandfathers towards girls and boys or unequal
bargaining power among pensioners within the same household. Our findings are
remarkable considering the small size of pension benefits. We show that in con-
trast to the pre-reform (targeted) system, beneficiaries of the universal pension
scheme are poor, but not among the poorest. Therfore, they might afford to invest
the extra pension income in their grandchildren. Our study thus adds an impor-
tant argument to the discussion of whether pension policies should be targeted to
specific individuals or provided universally.
There are three main conclusions from this dissertation. First, Chapter 2 demon-
strates that people in rural Thailand tend to make inconsistent decisions under
risk which might be an obstacle to risk management. Chapter 3 presents one of
the few institutions that provide insurance in rural Thailand: funeral insurance as-
sociations. This essay contributes to the understanding of the functioning and the
stability of the insurance scheme and highlights challenges for its future financial
viability. Finally, Chapter 4 addresses another institution that provides financial
protection to the people in rural Thailand: the social pension scheme. This essay
contributes to the literature on the impact of public pension schemes that goes
beyond the beneficiaries of the schemes. It provides evidence that children benefit
from the pension income of their grandparents with regard to school enrollment
and the employment status. In some way, this essay links back to Chapter 2, as
we would expect better educated children to make more consistent decisions.
Chapter 2
Allais for the Poor?
2.1 Introduction
Beginning with the famous paradoxes of Allais (1953), the experimental literature
has gathered abundant evidence that expected utility theory (EUT) does not pro-
vide an accurate description of individual decision behavior under risk. Whereas
the existence of the Allais paradox has been well documented, there are still com-
peting explanations about the origins of this behavior. One line of studies argues
that violations of EUT are related to less ability in understanding the often com-
plex decisions to be made (e.g. Levy (2008); Burks et al. (2009); Benjamin et al.
(2013); Choi et al. (2014)). Consequently, less able people should be more prone
to Allais-type behavior than others.
The potential relation between ability and Allais-type behavior is interesting for
understanding the Allais paradox, but it is also interesting because of possible
implications. Allais-type behavior is a deviation from strictly rational behavior
(as predicted by EUT) in the form of inconsistent decision making, and it may
thus indicate some kind of limitation in the quality of decisions. If these limitations
handicap less able people in particular, they may contribute to cementing their
inferior socio-economic position. Thus, poorly educated people in less-developed
?This article is joint work with Olaf Hübler, Lukas Menkhoff and Ulrich Schmidt. It was
published in the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 54(2). © Springer Science+Business
Media New York 2017. We thank Manel Baucells, Michael H. Birnbaum, Ferdinand M. Vieider
and W. Kip Viscusi for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Financial support
by the German Research Foundation (DFG, grant RTG 1723) is gratefully acknowledged.
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countries or regions, such as the rural parts of Northeast Thailand, would be
strongly affected.
However, there is hardly any evidence on the relation between Allais-type behavior
and the ability of individuals. The main systematic analysis we are aware of is a
study by Huck and Müller (2012) in which they examine a representative sample
of the Dutch population. The authors find that Allais-type behavior is more
pronounced among unemployed, lower-income, less-educated and less financially
sophisticated people, thereby supporting the above-mentioned ability hypothesis.
These findings strengthen our motivation to analyze the Allais paradox in a sample
of a relatively poor and poorly educated population (see Charness and Viceisza
(2016)).
We ran an Allais experiment with people from rural Thailand for whom we have
information on socio-demographic characteristics. This allows to replicate the
Huck and Müller approach with a sample of poor individuals. We expect to find a
relatively high level of EUT-violations (compared to studies from developed coun-
tries) and evidence in favor of the ability hypothesis in our sample. As the power
of standard socio-demographic characteristics in explaining Allais-type behavior is
limited, we extend the set of explanatory variables. We assume that characteris-
tics which were shown to influence decision making under risk may additionally
be relevant for the analysis.
We consider two kinds of characteristics as additional explanatory variables. First,
we consider a rather specific ability in handling the Allais task, where ability refers
to the correct processing of probability information. We label this variable as
math-related ability. Such specific ability may complement the more general abil-
ity examined so far (measured, for instance, by the educational level). We measure
math-related ability using the response in an experiment to test for possible vi-
olations of first-order stochastic dominance (FSD; see Birnbaum (1997)). The
selection of the FSD experiment is motivated by a novel theoretical contribu-
tion of this study which is based on prospective reference theory (Viscusi (1989)).
Prospective reference theory (PRT) provides a model of biased processing of prob-
ability information which has been regularly observed in empirical studies (Viscusi
and O'Connor (1984); Viscusi (1985); Viscusi et al. (1987)). Our analysis is the
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first to show that if Allais-type behavior is caused by biased processing of proba-
bility information, it should be positively correlated with violations of FSD under
PRT. We believe that biased processing of probabilities can be an important origin
of Allais-type behavior, in particular for poorly educated people as those in our
sample. At the same time, FSD violations clearly document suboptimal decision
making which may contribute to poverty traps.
The second novel kind of characteristics that we consider are indicators of risk-
related attitudes which may shape real economic decisions of individuals. Since,
ex ante, it is unclear whether risk averse or risk tolerant individuals are prone to
Allais-type behavior, we consider measures of the individual risk attitude in the
analyses. Second, we test whether optimism (or mood) plays a role. If so, the
relation to Allais-type behavior should be the same for both types of risk-related
attitudes, i.e. we expect risk tolerant and optimistic individuals to have similar
tendencies towards EUT-violations.
We investigate the behavior in the Allais experiment using a sample of 778 indi-
viduals from rural Northeast Thailand. This is Thailand's poorest region with a
median annual per capita income of about 1,500 US dollar. Lack of development
is also indicated by an average of 4 to 6 years of schooling of the adult population.
Overall, we have four key findings. First, about 54% of respondents in the Allais
experiment violate independence which is a violation rate at the upper range of
earlier studies. This level seems remarkably high since we take three measures
in the experimental design in order to avoid any upward bias: (1) We keep the
lotteries simple, especially when compared to the original setting (Allais (1953)).
This should facilitate consistent decision making in general (e.g. Levy (2008)).
(2) We avoid extremely high (hypothetical) payoffs as in the original design since
they have been shown to cause more Allais-type behavior (e.g. Huck and Müller
(2012)). (3) We implement incentive-compatible pay-offs of considerable size in
order to overcome often voiced concerns that otherwise decisions would be less
carefully made (Holt and Laury (2002))  although the evidence of this concern is
not very strong (Camerer and Hogarth (1999)).
Second, we analyze whether the relations between socio-demographic characteris-
tics and Allais-type behavior established by Huck and Müller (2012) hold among
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a poor, rural population. Similar to their study, we find that individuals with
more education, relevant work experience and greater financial sophistication are
less prone to Allais-type behavior. We take this as evidence that more able people
show less Allais-type behavior, as argued for example by Levy (2008).
Third, we extend the set of ability characteristics by a math-related variable, i.e.
the biased processing of probability information. Based on our theoretical analysis,
we address this bias by analyzing violations of FSD. We find that behavior in the
FSD task is related to Allais-type behavior in the expected way: Consistent with
PRT, violations of FSD occur jointly with inconsistent decisions in the Allais task.
Interestingly, the response in the experiment to test for violations of FSD seems
to be very different from individuals' cognitive ability.
Finally, we find that measures of risk-related behavior provide further explanatory
power in the cross-section of the population. More precisely, Allais-type behavior
is more frequently observed among individuals with higher risk tolerance and more
optimism.
The implications of our findings for development are unfavorable: The relations be-
tween various ability characteristics and Allais-type behavior may be interpreted
as another contribution to the often lamented poverty traps or vicious cycles.
However, the implications of the relation between risk tolerance or optimism (i.e.
particularly dynamic traits) and Allais-type behavior might be even more wor-
risome. Since risk tolerant and optimistic individuals are particularly prone to
inconsistent behavior, development problems might be reinforced.
Our research is related to many previous studies which document the incidence of
Allais-type behavior (Allais and Hagen (1979); Conlisk (1989); Birnbaum (1999)).
However, evidence stems mainly from laboratory experiments with students. Our
study is different in that we combine a household survey with field experiments,
such as in Tanaka et al. (2010) or Dohmen et al. (2011). In this respect, the study of
Huck and Müller (2012) is the first (and so far only one) to run Allais experiments
with a representative sample (of about 1,500 Dutch individuals). Also in line
with the ability hypothesis, Finkelshtain and Feinerman (1997) show that Allais-
type behavior is related to poor education and little experience using a sample
of 180 Israeli farmers. However, different from our research, these studies were
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conducted in advanced economies and they do not consider math- or risk-related
characteristics.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.2, we derive
the hypothesis to be tested from the extant literature and describe the experi-
ments. Section 2.3 presents our sample and the survey data. In Section 2.4, we
provide experimental outcomes and estimates of the relation of Allais-type be-
havior to socio-demographic variables and risk-related characteristics. Section 2.5
documents robustness analyses, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Hypotheses and experimental design
In this section, we present the experimental design and the theoretical background
of our analysis. Based on the reasoning provided in the introductory section, we
derive four hypotheses which we aim to test in our study.
2.2.1 Allais experiment
We ran an incentivized Allais experiment in the form of a standard common ratio
effect (Allais (1953); Kahneman and Tversky (1979)). Stimuli in the experiment
were presented as bags, each of which containing 100 cards with different payoffs
written on them. Participants got to draw one card from the bag that corresponded
to their choice in the experiment and received the respective amount in the local
currency Baht (Bt.). The common ratio effect consists of two choice problems:
Choice 1:
Bag A Bag B
100 cards to win Bt 75 80 cards to win Bt 100
20 cards to win Bt 0
Choice 2:
Bag C Bag D
25 cards to win Bt 75 20 cards to win Bt 100
75 cards to win Bt 0 80 cards to win Bt 0
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We used the standard random lottery incentive mechanism, i.e. subjects were told
that only one of the two choice problems would be paid out which was determined
by a coin flip (for further details, see Appendix A). Consider an expected utility
maximizer with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(•). As the utility
function in EUT is unique up to positive linear transformation we can normalize
it without loss of generality such that u(0) = 0. Then Bag A will be preferred to
Bag B if u(75) > 0.8u(100). Dividing this inequality by four yields 0.25u(75) >
0.2u(100) which is precisely the condition for Bag C being preferred to Bag D.
In other words, EU demands that a subject either chooses A and C or B and D.
Choices of A and D or B and C in contrast violate EUT. Abundant evidence has
been gathered that many people violate EU in this design. As the violating choice
pattern A and D is much more frequently observed than the pattern B and C,
these violations are systematic and, therefore, not likely caused by random error
(Conlisk (1989)).
2.2.2 Experiment of stochastic dominance
In the incentivized experiment on first-order stochastic dominance in the design
of Birnbaum (1997) subjects had to tackle the following choice problem:
Choice 3:
Bag E Bag F
90 cards to win Bt 96 85 cards to win Bt 96
5 cards to win Bt 14 5 cards to win Bt 90
5 cards to win Bt 12 10 cards to win Bt 12
This problem is easily conceived if we consider the underlying baseline gamble
which offers a 90% chance of winning 96 Bt and a 10% chance of winning 12 Bt.
Bag E is constructed from this baseline gamble by splitting up the 10% chance of
the worse prize into two events (with 5% probability each) and making the gamble
slightly better, i.e. by replacing one of the outcomes with 14 Bt. Consequently,
Bag E dominates the baseline gamble. Bag F is constructed from the baseline
gamble by splitting up the 90% chance of the better outcome into two events (with
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85% and 5% probability) and making the gamble slightly worse by replacing 96 Bt
in the split event with 5% probability by 90 Bt. Therefore, Bag F is dominated
by the baseline gamble and also dominated by Bag E, as first-order stochastic
dominance is transitive. Consistency with first-order stochastic dominance is one
of the most fundamental criterions of rationality in decision theory. Nevertheless,
Birnbaum (2004b) and Birnbaum (2004a) observed in a design identical to ours
violation rates of 70% for undergraduates and 50% for doctorates.
2.2.3 Theoretical predictions
In the most prominent version of PRT the utility of a gambleG = (x1, p1, x2, p2; ...;xn, pn)
where you win the monetary amount xi with probability pi is given by
V (G) =
n∑
i=1
u(xi)w(pi) with w(pi) =
γ( 1
n
) + ξpi
γ + ξ
for 0 < pi < 1, w(0) = 0, and w(1) = 1.
(2.1)
In this representation u is a standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
as in EUT and w(pi) is the weight of an outcome with probability pi. The trans-
formation of probabilities by w represents a biased processing of risk information
which is in line with empirical observations (Viscusi and O'Connor (1984); Viscusi
(1985); Viscusi et al. (1987)). To interpret the weight one can think of a subject
who has not full confidence in the stated probabilities and has a symmetric prior
(i.e. 1/n) where γ(ξ) represents the informational content of the prior (stated
probabilities). Then Bayesian updating leads precisely to the weights defined in
Equation 2.1.
In order to see how biased processing of probability information in PRT implies
violations of dominance, we assume for convenience that the utility function is
linear (i.e. u(x) = x) and define γ∗ = γ/(γ + ξ) and ξ∗ = ξ/(γ + ξ). Then a
subject will prefer Bag F to Bag E if γ∗(96 + 90 + 12)/3 + ξ∗(0.85∗96 +
0.05∗90 + 0.1∗12) > γ∗(96 + 14 + 12)/3 + ξ∗(0.9∗96 + 0.05∗14 + 0.05∗12)
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which implies 66γ∗ + 87.3ξ∗ > 40.7γ∗ + 87.7ξ∗, i.e. γ∗ > 0.016ξ∗. Hence,
already an extremely small bias towards the symmetric prior implies violations of
dominance.
PRT is also able to accommodate the common ratio effect. Easy calculations reveal
that Bag A is preferred to B if γ∗ > 0.2ξ∗ while Bag D is for all non-negative
γ∗ and ξ∗ preferred to Bag C. Hence γ∗ > 0.2ξ∗ implies the typical pattern of
violation reported in the experimental literature. This condition is also sufficient
for subjects violating dominance. Consequently, according to PRT, violations of
dominance and Allais-type behavior should be positively correlated.
2.2.4 Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical analysis and the state of the literature sketched in the in-
troductory section, we derive four hypotheses to be tested: (H1) First, we expect
to find a higher incidence of Allais-type behavior in our sample of a poor popu-
lation relative to previous findings from advanced economies. (H2) Second, we
expect to detect the same correlations between socio-demographic characteristics
and Allais-type behavior as in the study by Huck and Müller (2012). The idea
behind this hypothesis is that lack of ability might be associated with inconsistent
decision making such as in the Allais experiment. (H3) Extending the so far con-
sidered ability characteristics, we hypothesize that Allais-type behavior may be
partly caused by biased processing of probability information. According to PRT,
this implies that Allais-type behavior should be more frequently observed among
subjects who violate FSD. (H4) Finally, reaching beyond individual ability, we
expect behavior in the Allais experiment to be related to behavior regarding other
dimensions of risk, i.e. the individual risk attitude and optimism.
2.2.5 Procedure of the experiments
The experiments were conducted as part of a household survey. Besides socio-
demographic and other information, the survey includes measures of risk attitude
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and optimism. It was carried out at the household's dwelling, and the experiments
were conducted at the end.
The experiments were implemented following established standards as we argue
in detail below. The Allais experiment was always conducted first and the choice
problems were kept in the same order. As a result, the experiments were easier to
administer in the field. Moreover, Huck and Müller (2012) show that varying the
order of decisions in the Allais experiment has no effect on experimental outcomes.
After both decisions in the Allais experiment were made, the enumerator flipped a
coin in order to determine the choice problem to be paid out. Participants got to
draw one card from the bag that corresponded to their choice in the experiment.
When making choices in the Allais experiment, subjects were not aware of the
additional choice to be made, i.e. the FSD experiment. Note that irrespective
of the outcome of the Allais experiment, it is always optimal to choose Bag E
in the FSD experiment. After making their choice in the FSD experiment and
drawing a card from the chosen bag, participants received their final payment, i.e.
the sum of both cards drawn. The expected average payment was 136 Bt which
corresponds to roughly 4 US dollar, i.e. half a day's wage or more of an unskilled
worker. This amount should ensure that financial incentives were effective and
participants made careful decisions.
2.2.6 Measure of risk attitude
In order to measure risk attitude, we use two variables which have been applied,
for example, by Dohmen et al. (2011). The reliability of these simple survey items
in comparison with established experimental measures has been demonstrated for
Germany by Dohmen et al. (2011), for Northeast Thailand by Hardeweg et al.
(2013b), and for (small samples from) 30 countries by Vieider et al. (2015). These
findings highlight the usefulness of survey items for measuring risk attitudes in our
context. The first measure we use is based on the question How willing are you
to take risks in general?. Respondents rate their willingness on an 11-point scale
from 0 to 10. A value of 0 is assigned to individuals who are unwilling to take risk,
whereas being fully prepared to take risk corresponds to a value of 10.
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In addition to this general measure of risk attitude, we use a more domain-
specific measure based on a hypothetical investment question (see also Barsky
et al. (1997)). The question is as follows: Imagine you just won 100,000 Baht
in a lottery and you can invest this money in a business. There is a 50% chance
that the business is successful. If the business is successful you double the amount
invested after one year. If it is not successful you will lose half the amount you
invested. What fraction of the 100,000 Baht would you invest in the business?.
The answer, i.e. the fraction invested, provides a measure of risk tolerance. In
order to use this measure in the empirical analyses, we convert it to US dollar.
2.2.7 Measure of optimism
It is well known that risk-related behavior is influenced by the degree of optimism
of an individual (see, e.g., Puri and Robinson (2007)). We therefore generate a
measure of optimism based on the following question: Do you think you in person
will be better off next year?. Answers range from much better off, better off,
the same, worse off to much worse off. We aggregate the answers and generate
a binary variable which is equal to one if respondents believe they will be better
off or much better off, and zero otherwise. Consequently, this variable provides
a rough measure of optimism.
2.3 Data
A major advantage of this study is the availability of socio-demographic data
provided by a household survey and experimental data on the decision behavior
of the same individuals.
2.3.1 Household survey
The household survey, which is the basis of this study, was conducted in April and
May of 2010. It is part of a large research project with multiple waves of data
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collection (for more information, see Hardeweg et al. (2013a)). Due to a three-
stage sampling design, our data is representative for the rural population of the
selected province in Northeast Thailand. We have data on about 900 households
from Ubon Ratchathani, the province where the field experiments were conducted.
Household heads were interviewed in the majority of cases as our aim was to access
reliable information on the entire household. As a consequence, households are
representative for the rural population of this province but respondents are not,
as they are relatively old compared to the overall population, for example.
The household survey provides socio-demographic information about the respon-
dent and the household. Following the study by Huck and Müller (2012), we use
four groups of socio-demographic characteristics which may affect decision behav-
ior: (1) basic personal information, i.e. gender, age and education, (2) information
about the main occupation (which may indicate experience with risky decisions),
(3) information about the economic situation, primarily captured by household
income, and (4) information about financial behavior. We extend these variables
and further consider measures of math- and risk-related behavior.
2.3.2 Socio-demographic variables
Descriptive statistics of our sample are given in Table 2.1. Our sample is somewhat
biased towards women, as more than 60% of respondents are female. Respondents
are on average about 52 years old. They are older compared to the population as
a whole which is likely due to migration and our ambition to interview household
heads. In addition to the continuous measure of age, we provide descriptive statis-
tics for binary variables which indicate different age cohorts. We use them in the
main analysis in order to allow for non-linear effects. More precisely, we use the
same age cohorts as in the study by Huck and Müller (2012), as we aim to replicate
their analysis. Turning to education, we find that the years of schooling completed
by individuals in our sample are widely scattered. There are clear peaks at four
and six years which were the minimum years of schooling required some decades
ago. As for age, we use additional binary variables which indicate different edu-
cation levels, i.e. primary education, lower and upper secondary education, and
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having a university degree. Next, we consider the occupation of respondents. We
distinguish between wage-earners, being self-employed or unemployed, working in
the household (mainly housewives) and others. In particular, farmers belong to
the reference category others. The type of occupational activity might influence
familiarity with risky decisions similar to the Allais-case. Turning to the economic
status, we consider annual household income classified in three groups. Thereby,
we take again potential non-linearities into account. Thus, the binary variable
middle income class indicates households whose logarithm of income is in the
inner 50%-interval of all households. In the robustness analyses, we also consider
the (continuous) logarithm of income, the logarithm of income per capita, and the
logarithm of consumption per capita which is a reasonable welfare measure in the
context of a poor population (Hentschel and Lanjouw (1996)). Finally, we proxy
financial behavior by the number of savings accounts a household uses. This in-
cludes accounts at semi-formal financial institutions and multiple accounts at the
same institution. This variable can be interpreted as a measure of sophistication
and diversification. We use it to replace the variable (financial) assets applied by
Huck and Müller (2012). Their reliance on a savings account as an indicator of
inferior sophistication does not apply to Thailand because basically all households
use such an account.
2.3.3 Math-related characteristic
Our empirical analyses rely on a measure of math-related ability which was de-
scribed and motivated in Section 2.2: the processing of probability information
(measured by the response in the FSD experiment). In the robustness section,
we also use numeracy (mathscore) and a memory measure of cognitive ability.
However, this information is not available for all individuals in our sample.
2.3.4 Risk-related characteristics
In our empirical analysis we use two measures of risk-related behavior because
risky decisions in the Allais experiment could be influenced by individuals' at-
titude towards risk. These risk-related variables were introduced in Section 2.2
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above because they are new to the literature on Allais-type behavior. As a min-
imum, they can be interpreted as control variables to analyze the robustness of
the more standard socio-demographic variables. However, they can also be seen
as an independent source of Allais-type behavior which would  to the best of our
knowledge  establish a new relation.
2.3.5 Balanced sample
In order to analyze Allais-type behavior, we use a balanced sample where obser-
vations with missing information were excluded. The final sample is 15% smaller
compared to the original sample and comprises 778 observations. The composition
of excluded observations is somewhat different compared to the restricted sample.
As Table 2.1 shows, excluded individuals are on average more often in the highest
age category (Age ≥ 65); they are less educated, less risk tolerant and optimistic,
and they have lower incomes and fewer savings accounts. Most differences seem
to be a consequence of the exclusion of the very elderly.
2.4 Results
In this section, we describe the results of testing our four hypotheses. We report the
outcome of the Allais experiment (Section 2.4.1), its relation to standard socio-
demographic variables (Section 2.4.2) and math-related ability (Section 2.4.3),
and the relationship between Allais-type behavior and risk-related characteristics
(Section 2.4.4).
2.4.1 Results of the Allais experiment
The results of the Allais experiment are largely consistent with previous findings
in the literature, as Allais-type behavior (i.e. choices A and D, or B and C) is
shown by a considerable fraction of respondents and it reveals the usual systematic
pattern. Relative frequencies of choices are given in Table 2.2. These frequencies
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are all significantly different from each other which dispels possible concerns of
random responses.
Allais-type behavior is shown by 53.7% of individuals in our sample which is a
relatively high share compared to previous results from developed countries. We
take this finding as empirical support for Hypothesis 1. In the full sample (of
915 individuals), even 56.8% of individuals show Allais-type behavior which may
(potentially) indicate that we indeed exclude the less educated and optimistic
people from our initial sample. As we further see from Table 2.2, and consistent
with findings in previous studies, the incidence of Allais-type behavior is systematic
such that the combination AD (37.4%) is much more frequent than BC (16.3%).
Applying the test of Conlisk (1989), we find that the former fraction is significantly
higher than the latter (p < 0.01). These results indicate reliability of our data so
that we continue the analysis.
2.4.2 Socio-demographic correlates
Next, we analyze the role of individual socio-demographic characteristics in ex-
plaining Allais-type behavior. Column (1) of Table 2.3 presents the estimates of
a probit model where Allais-type behavior is explained by the standard socio-
demographic characteristics considered in the study by Huck and Müller (2012).
We measure Allais-type behavior using a binary variable which is equal to one if
an individual chooses option A and D, or B and C in the Allais experiment. The
socio-demographic variables are chosen and coded in a way that allows to repli-
cate the approach by Huck and Müller (2012). We discuss the variables and their
relation to Allais-type behavior in the order of the benchmark study.
Gender and age of participants in the experiment seem to be unrelated to Allais-
type behavior. In contrast, more education  in particular having a university
degree  is associated with less inconsistent behavior. Turning to occupation, un-
employed individuals and housewives are more likely to show Allais-type behavior
relative to those in the reference category, although the coefficient on housewife
is smaller. Different from our expectations, income seems to be unrelated to Allais-
type behavior (and this holds for various definitions of income, as demonstrated
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in the robustness section below). Finally, our measure of financial sophistication,
i.e. the use of several bank accounts (or other forms of savings accounts), is as-
sociated with less inconsistent behavior. All of the above relations hold when we
include only significant explanatory variables to the model (see Column (2)). In
sum, our results provide empirical support for three of the four significant relations
found in the benchmark study by Huck and Müller (2012). However, in contrast
to their study, we do not find a negative correlation between Allais-type behavior
and income. The latter may capture some form of ability (which may generate
higher income), resulting in less inconsistent behavior. In our case, the coefficient
is positive and at best weakly significant, which might indicate the presence of
different kinds of influences; we come back to this issue in Section 2.4.4 below.
2.4.3 Math-related correlate
In a next step, we add the measure of math-related ability, i.e. violations of
FSD, to the benchmark specification described above (estimated in Column (1)).
Results are presented in Column (3) of Table 2.3. As expected, the coefficient on
FSD violation is positive; it is statistically significant and improves the model's
explanatory power: The pseudo R2 increases from 0.06 to 0.07. We conclude
from the above findings that not just general ability, but also math-related ability
contributes to explaining Allais-type behavior.
2.4.4 Risk-related correlates
In order to investigate the relationship between the risk-related variables and
Allais-type behavior, we proceed similarly to the steps demonstrated above. First,
we add the general measure of risk attitude to the baseline model (estimated in
Column (1) of Table 2.3). Results are presented in Column (1) of Table 2.4. The
estimates demonstrate that the willingness to take risk of participants in the ex-
periment is positively related to Allais-type behavior. In a next step, we replace
the general measure of risk attitude by the domain-specific measure based on the
hypothetical investment question. Again, the coefficient is positive, although it
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is only weakly significant (see Column (2)). In Column (3) we include our mea-
sure of optimism in the baseline specification and find a strong positive correlation
between optimism and Allais-type behavior.
Finally, we add all risk-related variables to the baseline specification and present
the estimates in Column (4) of Table 2.4. This specification has the highest ex-
planatory power, as demonstrated by a pseudo R2 of 0.09. Moreover, our general
measure of risk attitude remains significant, whereas the domain-specific measure
becomes insignificant. This result might be no surprise given the estimates in Col-
umn (1) and (2). Although we add the largest number of variables to the model, the
previously significant coefficients retain their sign and significance. This indicates
that all groups of variables (i.e. the standard socio-demographic variables and the
math- and risk-related characteristics) indeed capture different kinds of relations
to Allais-type behavior. Whereas they all may represent some kind of ability,
each variable may provide an independent contribution to explaining Allais-type
behavior (as demonstrated by the nearly unchanged coefficients).
The standard socio-demographic characteristics could be interpreted as indica-
tors of general ability rooted in intellectual competence or in competence based
on experience. As demonstrated by the estimates of the relationship between
math-related ability and Allais-type behavior, math-related ability might play an
additional role in decision making in the number-based Allais setting. Finally,
the risk-related characteristics require some discussion because there is no clear ex
ante hypothesis regarding the sign of their coefficients (except for the identity of
the signs). These variables could be interpreted as indicators of ability, e.g. the
ability of carefulness. Risk tolerant and optimistic individuals may tend to make
quicker and less careful decisions and they might, thus, be more likely to show
Allais-type behavior, independent from their further abilities. Alternatively, the
risk-related characteristics could be interpreted as indicators of how people per-
ceive the risky choices. Choosing first option A and then option D clearly involves
some willingness to take risk and it may therefore be perceived by some people as
such; i.e. the choice of A and D should be related to a high level of risk tolerance.
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2.5 Further results and robustness
In this section, we report further results of robustness analyses which largely sup-
port our main findings. The following analyses were conducted: (1) We estimate
the baseline model again, using continuous instead of categorical variables. (2)
We substitute the income measure by reasonable alternatives and (3) estimate
the baseline model separately for different kinds of EUT-violations; (4) we control
for cognitive ability in a restricted sample, and (5) apply alternative estimation
methods.
2.5.1 Modified age and education definition
The model specifications reported so far are based on categorical variables of age
and education in order to replicate the study by Huck and Müller (2012). If one
aims for a more parsimonious specification, however, a continuous definition of
these variables may be suitable. Thus, we use years of age and years of school-
ing as alternative variable definitions. As evident from the results in Table 2.5,
Column (1), our previous findings do not change much. However, the model's
explanatory power is somewhat worse which indicates that both relations might
be non-linear. Thus, we continue to follow the categorical approach.
2.5.2 Income measures
We run further analyses where we replace our binary measure of income by the
logarithm of household income, the logarithm of per capita income and the loga-
rithm of per capita consumption. As demonstrated by the results in Columns (2)
to (4) of Table 2.5, neither the coefficients nor the overall estimation quality change
much when we use those alternative measures of income. Interestingly, the coef-
ficients are all positive, and the coefficient on Log (income per capita) is even
marginally significant. Given the positive coefficients on the risk-related variables,
our findings may suggest that the income coefficients pick up characteristics related
to risk-taking, as risk-taking is associated with higher income. Indeed, when we
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add the risk-related variables to the baseline specification, the income coefficient
decreases in size (see Table 2.3, Column (1) and Table 2.4, Column (1)).
2.5.3 Kind of EUT-violation
In Section 2.4 above, we document variables which contribute to explaining Allais-
type behavior in general. We now turn to an individual examination of both
kinds of Allais-type behavior, i.e. the combinations of choices AD and BC in the
experiment (see Table 2.2). Thereby, we investigate whether Allais-type behavior
is overall driven by individual characteristics, or whether the relations to those
characteristics are different for both kinds of Allais-type behavior.
Column (1) of Table 2.6 presents again the estimates of the baseline model in Col-
umn (4) of Table 2.4. Results for choices AD and BC are given in Column (2) and
(3), respectively. For most explanatory variables, there are no apparent differences
between the results in Column (2) and (3). For instance, the gender coefficient
remains insignificant and the coefficients on unemployed and housewife retain
their sign, though the latter becomes insignificant in Column (3). The coefficients
on number of savings accounts and optimism are smaller, and the former be-
comes insignificant.
However, there are a few marked differences between the results in Column (2) and
(3). The choice of A and D seems to be driven by younger, less educated individuals
who violate FSD more often; this is again in line with PRT. In short, these findings
roughly match the overall results presented in Column (1). By contrast, the choice
of B and C seems to be driven by older individuals willing to take more risk. Thus,
there seem to be some differences which cautiously supports the notion that our
results are neither due to noise nor due to a general, ability-driven (all kinds of)
Allais-type behavior.
2.5.4 Cognitive abilities
The behavior in the FSD task could be interpreted as a sign of individual percep-
tion or cognitive ability. It may therefore be important to control for cognitive
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ability in the empirical analysis (see, e.g., Burks et al. (2009)). Similarly, it has
been argued that risk-taking is positively related to cognitive ability (see Benjamin
et al. (2013)), although this has been challenged by Andersson et al. (2016). In the
following analysis, we explicitly control for cognitive ability, although we only have
data available for a much smaller sample. Whereas our main data is from 2010, in-
formation about cognitive ability was compiled in 2013 with the same households.
However, in many cases different members of household were interviewed in each
survey wave, and sticking to the exact same persons reduces the sample size from
778 to 476.
We use two measures which address aspects of cognitive ability (inspired by Chris-
telis et al. (2010)): a measure of numeracy and a measure of memory and verbal
ability (see Appendix B for a full description). The numeracy measure is based
on outcomes of six tasks. Tasks 1 to 4 are adopted from Cole et al. (2011), and
tasks 5 and 6 are intended to represent task 2 and 3 from a standard survey used
by Christelis et al. (2010). The measure of verbal ability has been used, among
others, by Christelis et al. (2010) or Dohmen et al. (2010). Both dimensions of
cognitive ability are positively and significantly correlated with each other, with a
coefficient of 0.37.
In Column (1) of Table 2.7, we again estimate the model of Column (4) in Ta-
ble 2.4 with our restricted sample, but we exclude the domain-specific measure of
risk attitude. There seem to be no qualitative differences between the results in
Column (1) of Table 2.7 and those in Column (4) of Table 2.4. The coefficients on
housewife and number of savings accounts become insignificant, whereas the
coefficient on upper secondary education becomes significant. The latter could
be due to the reduction in the size of our sample which no longer contains any
individual holding a university degree.
In Column (2), we add the variable numeracy (mathscore) to the baseline speci-
fication. As expected, the coefficient on numeracy (mathscore) is negative which
indicates that better numeracy may result in less Allais-type behavior. Next, we
add our second measure of cognitive ability to the specification, i.e. the number of
animals people can mention within one minute (see Column (3)). This variable is
intended to measure the quality of memory and verbal expression. The coefficient
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is positive but not significant.
Third, in Column (4) we provide results of the acid test of including our mea-
sures of FSD violations and numeracy in one specification. Interestingly, both
coefficients retain their sign and significance which cautiously indicates that FSD
violations do not primarily inform about numeracy but instead about something
else. This element may be biased processing of probability information (as pre-
dicted by PRT).
The results are similar when we include all variables in one specification (see
Column (5)), although the coefficient on numeracy is insignificant. However,
most importantly, all other coefficients are almost unaffected by the inclusion of
the variable numeracy (mathscore). This clearly indicates that neither FSD
violations nor risk-taking are substitutes for cognitive ability.
2.5.5 Alternative estimation methods
So far, we estimated marginal effects of ordinary probit models, as our dependent
variable is binary. Estimates of our final model, i.e. the specification of Column (4)
in Table 2.4, where the investment-based measure of risk attitude is excluded,
are presented in Column (1) of Table 2.8. In the following, we conduct further
robustness analyses, using alternative methods to estimate the coefficients and
standard errors.
The behavior of residents within a village might be different from the behavior of
other people, as it could be influenced by the communication within the village
and village-specific environmental conditions. For example, the failure of risky
investments in a village may increase the risk aversion of other residents within
the same village, while people from outside might be unaffected. In general, if a
variable varies strongly between villages but only little within, the variance of the
regressor (here the willingness to take risk) is too low; this is the Moulton problem
(Moulton (1986)). In such a case, conventional estimations of probit models could
be misleading. The effect of the individual risk attitude could be overestimated or
inconsistently estimated. There are several ways to address this problem. One is
to calculate village-robust standard errors. Results are presented in Column (2)
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of Table 2.8. The coefficients are naturally the same as in Column (1). Although
most standard errors are also very similar, some coefficients become insignificant.
The method described above does not consider a potential correlation between
the village influence and the relation between risk aversion and Allais-type behav-
ior. Similar to time-invariant individual effects in panel models, village-invariant
household effects can be modeled. This is applied in Column (3) of Table 2.8. The
estimated standard errors are larger than those in Column (1) and (2), but more
similar to those in Column (2).
Finally, there could be an interdependent link between the dependent variable and
the regressors. For instance, the positive correlation between FSD violations and
Allais-type behavior could be interpreted such that FSD violations cause Allais-
type behavior  or the other way around. Moreover, an additional but unobserved
influence may exist, causing FSD violations and Allais-type behavior at the same
time. In such a case, the coefficient on FSD violation in Column (1) of Table 2.8
would be overestimated and inconsistent. An instrumental variable approach could
solve this problem, yet it is difficult to find adequate instruments. Lewbel (2012)
suggests a method that uses only internal information and allows the identification
of structural parameters. The method requires the availability of regressors that
are uncorrelated with the product of heteroscedastic errors. Results of Lewbel's
method are presented in Column (4) of Table 2.8. Finally, results of Lewbel's
method in combination with village-robust standard errors are presented in Col-
umn (5).
The estimates in Column (4) and (5) demonstrate that most coefficients, and
particularly those which were significant in previous estimations, retain their sign.
Most importantly, the coefficients of those variables which we introduce as new
explanations of Allais-type behavior consistently retain their sign and significance
level.
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2.6 Conclusions
This study is the first to investigate Allais-type behavior in a large sample of a
poor, rural population. The study is motivated by the concern that people in
less-developed countries could be more prone to inconsistent decision making as in
the Allais experiment which could be an expression of suboptimal decision making
in general. We cannot compare the overall quality of decisions across countries
with our data, but we find clear evidence that the degree of Allais-type behavior
is remarkably high compared to previous studies.
Despite this difference to earlier work, we aim for, and succeed in, replicating
the approach by Huck and Müller (2012) who are the first to relate Allais-type
behavior to individual socio-demographic characteristics in a broad, representative
sample (of the Dutch population). We provide empirical support for three (of
four) significant relations which were found by Huck and Müller (2012) and which
indicate a link of ability (e.g. captured by the educational level) to consistent
decision making.
We extend the approach by also considering math- and risk-related characteris-
tics which greatly improves the explanatory power of our model (as measured by
the pseudo R2). The coefficients of these variables are all statistically significant
in various specifications. Whereas the math-related characteristic further elab-
orates on the ability-based explanation of Allais-type behavior, the risk-related
characteristics indicate that further influences might play a role. Whatever their
interpretation may be, the implication is unfortunate because particularly risk-
tolerant and optimistic people tend to make inconsistent decisions under risk (as
measured by the Allais experiment). At the same time, better education, including
improved math-related ability, may reduce inconsistent behavior.
Our theoretical prediction derived from PRT, i.e. the positive relation between
FSD violations and Allais-type behavior, is supported by the data. This finding
constitutes a challenge for other theories of decision making under risk, e.g. cu-
mulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), which cannot explain
violations of FSD. In these theories, violations of FSD are regarded as random
error. In this case, however, FSD violations should not be correlated with Allais-
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type behavior. We do not claim that our data provide a stringent test of PRT or
alternative theories; here future work under more controlled conditions is needed.
Overall, we contribute to the debate on the potential roots of Allais-type behavior
by analyzing a novel kind of population and by uncovering new relations. We are
aware that our sample is specific and favorable for detecting ability-based relations.
We hope that our results stimulate further investigations in order to reveal robust
stylized facts across various population samples and approaches.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of explanatory variables
Excluded Observations Restricted sample Tests for equality of two means
Mean #Obs Mean #Obs T-stat. P-values
Female 0.63 137 0.62 778 0.56 0.57
Age 52.39 135 51.88 778 0.76 0.45
Age 17-24 0.00 135 0.01 778 -0.39 0.70
Age 25-34 0.06 135 0.04 778 1.94 0.05
Age 35-44 0.20 135 0.16 778 1.59 0.11
Age 45-54 0.32 135 0.40 778 -3.00 0.00
Age 55-64 0.23 135 0.28 778 -2.19 0.03
Age ≥ 65 0.19 135 0.10 778 4.20 0.00
Years of education 5.04 111 5.57 778 -2.98 0.00
No or primary education 0.89 111 0.84 778 2.35 0.02
Lower sec. education 0.06 111 0.08 778 -1.13 0.26
Upper sec. education 0.03 111 0.05 778 -1.41 0.16
University degree 0.01 111 0.03 778 -2.27 0.02
Wage-earner 0.22 111 0.23 778 -0.29 0.77
Self-employed 0.06 111 0.05 778 0.55 0.58
Unemployed 0.02 111 0.02 778 -0.66 0.51
Housewife 0.03 111 0.02 778 1.23 0.22
Other occupational status 0.68 111 0.67 778 0.18 0.86
Log(income per capita) 7.20 137 7.60 765 -8.40 0.00
Middle income class 0.47 137 0.62 778 -5.17 0.00
Log(consump. per capita) 7.56 137 7.79 774 -7.04 0.00
No. of saving accounts 0.63 134 1.76 778 -20.43 0.00
FSD violation 0.68 111 0.68 778 -0.07 0.94
Willingness to take risk 4.85 108 5.06 778 -1.28 0.20
Hypo. Investments/1000 2.23 107 2.84 778 -7.95 0.00
Optimism: better off 0.48 108 0.57 778 -2.82 0.00
Note: Other occupational status is primarily farmer. The share is 0.58 among the excluded observations and 0.62 in the
restricted sample. This means that 92.5% of the individuals with other occupational status are farmers.
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Table 2.2: Outcome of the Allais
experiment
Allais decisions Freq. Percent Cum.
AC 202 25.96 25.96
AD 291 37.40 63.36
BC 127 16.32 79.69
BD 158 20.31 100.00
Total 778 100.00
Testing for uniform distribution
(H0: P(AC) = P(AD) = P(BC) = P(BD) = 0.25)
T = 18.64 > Chi2(3;0.95) = 7.82
Allais behavior Freq. Percent Cum.
No 360 46.27 46.27
Yes 418 53.73 100.00
Total 778 100.00
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Table 2.3: Probit estimation results: baseline
and extended model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.043 -0.025
(0.040) (0.040)
Age 25-34 -0.025 -0.058
(0.259) (0.257)
Age 35-44 -0.147 -0.164
(0.242) (0.238)
Age 45-54 -0.133 -0.144
(0.241) (0.239)
Age 55-64 -0.262 -0.275
(0.231) (0.227)
Age ≥ 65 -0.143 -0.146
(0.245) (0.243)
Lower sec. education -0.058 -0.070
(0.072) (0.072)
Upper sec. education -0.127 -0.135
(0.088) (0.087)
University degree -0.438*** -0.446*** -0.447*** -0.452***
(0.080) (0.072) (0.077) (0.071)
Wage-earner -0.055 -0.057
(0.059) (0.060)
Self-employed -0.019 -0.036
(0.083) (0.083)
Unemployed 0.411*** 0.415*** 0.411*** 0.417***
(0.064) (0.060) (0.064) (0.059)
Housewife 0.316*** 0.323*** 0.319*** 0.327***
(0.105) (0.102) (0.103) (0.099)
Middle income class 0.020 0.024
(0.039) (0.039)
No. of sav. accounts -0.038* -0.046** -0.040* -0.049**
(0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020)
FSD violation 0.141*** 0.134***
(0.040) (0.039)
Observations 778 778 778 778
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. (1) baseline model (BM); (2) only significant regressors
from (1); (3) BM+FSD violation; (4) only significant regressors from (3).
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Table 2.4: Probit estimation results: extended
model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.043 -0.030 -0.059 -0.036
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042)
Age 25-34 0.015 0.009 0.047 0.065
(0.261) (0.261) (0.251) (0.251)
Age 35-44 -0.104 -0.118 -0.084 -0.048
(0.250) (0.248) (0.244) (0.247)
Age 45-54 -0.080 -0.100 -0.059 -0.005
(0.248) (0.246) (0.241) (0.245)
Age 55-64 -0.210 -0.231 -0.190 -0.138
(0.242) (0.238) (0.237) (0.244)
Age ≥ 65 -0.084 -0.101 -0.055 0.022
(0.255) (0.253) (0.249) (0.251)
Lower sec. education -0.053 -0.048 -0.092 -0.098
(0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Upper sec. education -0.131 -0.127 -0.122 -0.131
(0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088)
University degree -0.450*** -0.448*** -0.442*** -0.464***
(0.075) (0.076) (0.079) (0.070)
Wage-earner -0.059 -0.052 -0.079 -0.084
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061)
Self-employed -0.040 -0.025 0.001 -0.038
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084)
Unemployed 0.410*** 0.409*** 0.428*** 0.424***
(0.067) (0.067) (0.052) (0.055)
Housewife 0.308*** 0.316*** 0.285** 0.276**
(0.109) (0.105) (0.117) (0.120)
Middle income class 0.016 0.022 0.005 0.004
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
No. of saving accounts -0.034* -0.042** -0.042** -0.042**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Willingness to take risk 0.019** 0.019*
(0.008) (0.010)
Hypo. investments/1000 0.032* 0.011
(0.017) (0.021)
Optimism: better off 0.155*** 0.160***
(0.039) (0.039)
FSD violation 0.145***
(0.040)
Observations 778 778 778 778
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.09
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; (1) baseline model (BM)+willingness to take risk; (2)
BM+hypothetical investments/1000; (3) BM+optimism; (4)=(1)+hypothetical invest-
ments+optimism+FSD violation.
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Table 2.5: Probit estimation results using
alternative variable definitions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.045 -0.045 -0.044 -0.040
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Age -0.004** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of education -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.020***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Wage-earner -0.074 -0.076 -0.076 -0.081
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Self-employed -0.022 -0.041 -0.040 0.018
(0.082) (0.083) (0.085) (0.084)
Unemployed 0.411*** 0.413*** 0.413*** 0.415***
(0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.059)
Housewife 0.327*** 0.331*** 0.323*** 0.323***
(0.101) (0.100) (0.102) (0.101)
Middle income class 0.029
(0.038)
No. of saving accounts -0.039* -0.043** -0.040* -0.044**
(0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Log(income) 0.037
(0.023)
Log(income per capita) 0.045*
(0.025)
Log(consump. per capita) 0.029
(0.035)
Observations 778 768 765 774
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 2.6: Probit estimation results: extended
model
AD+BC AD BC
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.036 -0.053 0.011
(0.042) (0.040) (0.028)
Age 25-34 0.065 -0.182 0.896***
(0.251) (0.191) (0.010)
Age 35-44 -0.048 -0.312** 0.975***
(0.247) (0.152) (0.004)
Age 45-54 -0.005 -0.326 0.992***
(0.245) (0.214) (0.004)
Age 55-64 -0.138 -0.413*** 0.996***
(0.244) (0.158) (0.001)
Age ≥ 65 0.022 -0.307** 0.953***
(0.251) (0.133) (0.006)
Lower sec. education -0.098 -0.045 -0.051
(0.073) (0.068) (0.045)
Upper sec. education -0.131 -0.192*** 0.074
(0.088) (0.067) (0.079)
University degree -0.464*** -0.310***
(0.070) (0.056)
Wage-earner -0.084 -0.002 -0.074**
(0.061) (0.058) (0.034)
Self-employed -0.038 -0.024 -0.011
(0.084) (0.080) (0.058)
Unemployed 0.424*** 0.217* 0.238**
(0.055) (0.120) (0.120)
Housewife 0.276** 0.214 0.042
(0.120) (0.144) (0.113)
Middle income class 0.004 -0.021 0.020
(0.040) (0.038) (0.027)
No. of saving accounts -0.042** -0.017 -0.022
(0.021) (0.020) (0.016)
FSD violation 0.145*** 0.176*** -0.028
(0.040) (0.036) (0.029)
Willingness to take risk 0.019* 0.002 0.016**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007)
Hypo. investments/1000 0.011 0.024 -0.017
(0.021) (0.020) (0.015)
Optimism: better off 0.160*** 0.094** 0.062**
(0.039) (0.037) (0.027)
Observations 778 778 778
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.07 0.05
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.030
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: Specification with mathscore and memory
measure (restricted sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.052 -0.042 -0.033 -0.032 -0.059
(0.051) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.051)
Age 25-34 0.335** 0.288 0.301 0.257 0.329**
(0.143) (0.193) (0.183) (0.222) (0.150)
Age 35-44 -0.012 -0.072 -0.046 -0.116 -0.035
(0.306) (0.318) (0.316) (0.315) (0.311)
Age 45-54 0.047 -0.054 -0.019 -0.089 0.014
(0.300) (0.310) (0.309) (0.306) (0.304)
Age 55-64 -0.022 -0.143 -0.105 -0.179 -0.057
(0.305) (0.312) (0.313) (0.307) (0.309)
Age ≥ 65 0.030 -0.129 -0.087 -0.153 -0.005
(0.306) (0.324) (0.325) (0.318) (0.314)
Lower sec. education -0.163* -0.078 -0.106 -0.078 -0.142
(0.091) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.092)
Upper sec. education -0.375*** -0.321*** -0.363*** -0.338*** -0.345***
(0.099) (0.109) (0.102) (0.106) (0.106)
Wage-earner -0.129* -0.125 -0.131* -0.119 -0.124
(0.078) (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) (0.078)
Self-employed 0.037 0.033 0.032 0.001 0.038
(0.114) (0.111) (0.111) (0.114) (0.114)
Unemployed 0.391*** 0.377*** 0.382*** 0.379*** 0.388***
(0.054) (0.068) (0.063) (0.066) (0.056)
Housewife 0.156 0.203 0.212 0.200 0.148
(0.147) (0.135) (0.132) (0.134) (0.149)
Middle income class 0.105** 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.124** 0.105**
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050)
No. of sav. accounts 0.021 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.018
(0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Optimism: better off 0.191*** 0.188***
(0.051) (0.051)
FSD violation 0.112** 0.100* 0.120**
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054)
Willing to take risk 0.021* 0.019*
(0.011) (0.011)
Mathscore -0.036* -0.040* -0.034
(numeracy) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
No. of animals 0.001
(memory measure) (0.005)
Observations 476 476 476 476 476
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.09
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000
Notes: Marginal effects are reported. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p
< 0.01. (1) baseline model (BM)+optimism+FSD+risk; (2) BM+mathscore; (3) BM+memory; (4)
BM+FSD+mathscore; (5) BM +optimism+FSD+risk+mathscore.
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Table 2.8: Alternative estimation methods (and extensions)
Probit Probit with
village robust
std. errors
Probit with
village-
invariant
effects
Lewbel Lewbel with
village robust
std. errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.040 -0.040 -0.088 -0.043 -0.043
(0.041) (0.062) (0.130) (0.037) (0.057)
Age 25-34 0.061 0.061 0.756 -0.007 -0.007
(0.251) (0.368) (0.792) (0.230) (0.306)
Age 35-44 -0.050 -0.050 0.298 -0.117 -0.117
(0.247) (0.350) (0.749) (0.219) (0.277)
Age 45-54 -0.007 -0.007 0.579 -0.075 -0.075
(0.244) (0.335) (0.752) (0.217) (0.263)
Age 55-64 -0.140 -0.140 0.101 -0.196 -0.196
(0.243) (0.333) (0.755) (0.218) (0.265)
Age ≥ 65 0.017 0.017 0.610 -0.052 -0.052
(0.250) (0.352) (0.780) (0.223) (0.283)
Lower sec. education -0.102 -0.102 -0.304 -0.095 -0.095
(0.073) (0.109) (0.222) (0.067) (0.100)
Upper sec. education -0.133 -0.133 -0.368 -0.120 -0.120
(0.088) (0.138) (0.276) (0.083) (0.132)
University degree -0.464*** -0.464*** -1.651*** -0.411*** -0.411***
(0.070) (0.072) (0.506) (0.109) (0.097)
Wage-earner -0.086 -0.086 -0.250 -0.079 -0.079
(0.060) (0.091) (0.204) (0.055) (0.083)
Self-employed -0.039 -0.039 -0.024 -0.037 -0.037
(0.084) (0.108) (0.260) (0.078) (0.103)
Unemployed 0.425*** 0.425*** 1.503** 0.431*** 0.431***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.637) (0.112) (0.074)
Housewife 0.275** 0.275 0.683 0.262* 0.262
(0.121) (0.180) (0.514) (0.139) (0.169)
Middle income class 0.003 0.003 -0.012 -0.002 -0.002
(0.039) (0.063) (0.126) (0.036) (0.057)
No. of sav. accounts -0.040* -0.040 -0.179*** -0.036* -0.036
(0.021) (0.032) (0.068) (0.019) (0.030)
Willing to take risk 0.022*** 0.022* 0.071*** 0.019** 0.019*
(0.008) (0.011) (0.027) (0.008) (0.010)
Optimism: better off 0.160*** 0.160*** 0.472*** 0.150*** 0.150***
(0.039) (0.058) (0.123) (0.036) (0.054)
FSD violation 0.146*** 0.146** 0.409*** 0.135*** 0.135**
(0.040) (0.065) (0.128) (0.037) (0.060)
Observations 778 778 778 778 778
Pseudo (centered) R2 0.09 0.09 - 0.11 0.11
Prob > Chi2 (F) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
Appendix A. Description of the experiments
The decision tasks were conducted as described in the following instructions. Each
enumerator had a set of six bags, each representing one of the four alternatives of
the Allais questions and the two alternatives to elicit FSD violations. Each bag
contained 100 cards displaying the respective payoffs, with the number of cards of
each payoff corresponding to the respective probability.
Game
This is a game to learn about your behavior towards choices. It is just for research
purposes. You will be asked to make a few decisions. These decisions lead to
outcomes where you may win money depending on your choice; however, you can
never lose any money. In the following we ask you to draw a card from one out
of two bags. In each bag there are 100 cards. The 100 cards represent different
pay-offs, written on each card. This pay-off varies between 0 and 100 Baht.
General procedure
1. At the beginning we tell how many cards with which pay-offs are in the bags.
2. Then, please, choose which bag you prefer.
3. Finally, you draw one card (without seeing it) from the chosen bag and you
will receive the amount in Baht for which this card stands.
Do you want to participate in the game?
7 Participate in game Yes:  No: 
If no, what is the reason why you do not want to participate in the
game?
8 Reason of no-participation
Religion: 
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Bad Experience: 
Never play: 
Other, specify:
Procedure for choice 1 and 2:
We ask you to make two choices (choice 1 and choice 2) between two bags each
with different combinations of cards. Then the enumerator will flip a coin. If the
result is king, you can draw a card from the bag of your choice 1. If the result
is palace then you can draw a card from the bag of your choice 2. From which
bag would you prefer to draw a card, considering that you will receive the pay-off
written on the card you draw?
Choice 1:
Bag A Bag B
100 cards to win Bt 75 80 cards to win Bt 100
20 cards to win Bt 0
What is your choice 1?
9 Choice 1 A:  B: 
Choice 2:
Bag C Bag D
25 cards to win Bt 75 20 cards to win Bt 100
75 cards to win Bt 0 80 cards to win Bt 0
What is your choice 2?
10 Choice 2 C:  D: 
What is the result of the coin toss?
11 Coin King:  Palace: 
PAY-OFF
What was the pay-off written on the card drawn?
12 Pay-off 1 0:  75:  100: 
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Procedure for choice 3:
Now you can win additional money by making one more choice (choice 3). From
which bag do you prefer to draw a card?
Choice 3:
Bag E Bag F
90 cards to win Bt 96 85 cards to win Bt 96
5 cards to win Bt 14 5 cards to win Bt 90
5 cards to win Bt 12 10 cards to win Bt 12
What is your choice 3?
13 Choice 3 E:  F: 
PAY-OFF
What was the pay-off written on the card drawn?
14 Pay-off 2 12:  14:  90:  96: 
Total amount received THB
Signature
Name
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Appendix B. Description of the tasks on cognitive
ability
The first task is a measure of memory and verbal ability. The numeracy variable
is based on answers to the following six questions which are displayed below (ques-
tion 2 to question 7), and the respective mathscore is constructed as number of
correct answers (ranging from 0 to 6).
1
I would like you to name as many different animals as you can in 60 seconds. Enu-
merator: write responses in box below. Please, do not tell the respondent whether the answer is
right or wrong. Please mark answers using the check list.)
2 What is 45+72?
Please fill in answer
here or tick box to the
right
 Do not know
 No answer
3
If you have four friends and would like
to give each of your friends four sweets,
how many sweets do you need?
 Do not know
 No answer
4 What is 5% of 200?
 Do not know
 No answer
5
Suppose you want to buy a bag of rice
that costs 270 Baht. You only have one
1000 Baht note. How much change will
you get?
 Do not know
 No answer
6
In a sale, a shop is selling all items at
half price. Before the sale a mattress
costs 3000 Baht. How much will the
mattress cost in the sale?
 1500 Baht
 4500 Baht
 6000 Baht
 Do not know
 No answer
7
A second-hand motorbike dealer is
selling a motorbike for 12000 Baht.
This is two thirds of what it costs new.
How much did the motorbike cost new?
 9000 Baht
 16000 Baht
 18000 Baht
 24000 Baht
 Do not know
 No answer
Chapter 3
Risk-type and preference-based selec-
tion, and stability of funeral insur-
ance associations in Northeast Thai-
land‡
3.1 Introduction
Adverse selection is a significant problem for the insurability of risks in community-
based insurance organizations, as it may shift premiums upwards and destabilize
insurance schemes (Biener and Eling (2012)).3,4 In contrast to conventional insur-
ance markets, preventive measures such as risk classification, signaling or strict,
formal entry regulations are often not applied, because collecting the necessary
‡This article is joint work with Juliane Zenker. It was published in the Discussion Paper
Series of the Courant Research Centre Poverty, Equity and Growth (No. 198). The research
was funded by the German Research Foundation in its Research Training Group RTG 1723
Globalization and Development and its Research Unit FOR 756. We are grateful to Andreas
Wagener and Lukas Menkhoff for discussions and many helpful comments.
3In a systematic review of the literature on microinsurance, Biener and Eling (2012) identify
information asymmetries as the leading cause hindering the insurability of risks. Further, the
authors note that insufficient resources to evaluate risks, the small size of insurance groups, and
high premiums seem to be prominent problems.
4Examples of studies that report on destabilized community-based insurance schemes or ad-
verse selection in microinsurance are, for instance, Wang et al. (2006), Criel and Waelkens (2003),
Allegri et al. (2006), Polonsky et al. (2009), Supakankunti (2000), Ito and Kono (2010), McCord
and Osinde (2005), Morduch (2006), Giesbert et al. (2011).
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information is costly and the organizational capacity is limited (Biener (2013)).
However, despite the absence of such preventive measures, one line of community-
based insurance organizations does not seem to suffer from adverse consequences:
funeral insurance associations (see e.g. Bryant and Prohmmo (2002), Dercon et al.
(2006)).
In this study, we shed light on the mechanisms that contribute to the stability
of funeral insurance schemes by taking a closer look at Funeral Aid Associations
(FAAs) in Northeast Thailand. FAAs offer funeral insurance at a uniform price
without (strict) entry regulations. This provides an incentive for high-risk individ-
uals to join the scheme, as they may benefit financially from insurance membership.
Surprisingly, FAA premiums seem to be very stable and membership figures are
even rising (see, e.g., McCord and Tatin-Jaleran (2013)). To explain this puz-
zle, two general directions of reasoning are possible. First, for whatever reason,
individuals with a high mortality risk may not react to the financial incentive
to join the scheme. Second, a counter-balancing selection of low-risk individuals
may coexist. In our empirical analysis we find that high-risk individuals are in-
deed more likely to join an FAA, making the first hypothesis unlikely. Hence, this
finding suggests the coexistence of a counter-balancing selection: Low-risk individ-
uals may deliberately join the scheme, although for them, the insurance premium
exceeds the expected value of compensations, i.e. premiums are not actuarially
fair. In this study, we investigate potential drivers of this counter-balancing selec-
tion. Previous studies by Bryant and Prohmmo (2002) and Dercon et al. (2006)
suggest strong intra-community ties as an explanation for the stability of funeral
insurance associations.5 The authors argue that social ties imply solidarity and
inclusiveness, forcing low-risk individuals to subsidize high-risk members of their
community. However, in our context this explanation seems unlikely given that
FAAs usually have thousands of members and cover large areas. In this study,
we argue that the stability of funeral insurance schemes does not (only) rely on
5The authors investigate patterns of selection into funeral societies. Dercon et al. (2006)
find that larger households are better represented in funeral insurance schemes in Ethiopia and
Tanzania. Those households may benefit more from the equal-contribution per household rule
than smaller households. Further, Bryant and Prohmmo (2002) provide evidence that certain
riskier households are much more likely to receive payments from funeral societies in Northeast
Thailand, while paying equal premiums.
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social cohesion. We assume that it might be based on a family-oriented willingness
of certain low-risk individuals to pay more for insurance than the actuarially fair
premium. We provide a theoretical framework which demonstrates that individu-
als with close family ties may join the insurance at lower risk levels. Such a high
preference for insurance could be based on family pressure, reciprocity or altruism,
as in the event of death, the family of the deceased, and in particular the spouse,
may suffer the most from the social and financial costs of an uninsured funeral.
Our empirical results demonstrate that married individuals are indeed more likely
to join the insurance, and that their mortality risk is relatively low. However, we
do not find similar results for the presence of children in a household.
3.2 Background
Before we analyze selection patterns and the stability of FAAs, it is important
to highlight some key features of the FAA insurance scheme. We briefly give
some background information about the high demand for funeral insurance in the
region of our study. Moreover, we provide information on how the FAA insurance
mechanism is set up, on the characteristics and comparability of FAAs across the
region and eligibility criteria for membership.
General. Funeral insurance is a popular financial service in rural Northeast
Thailand. The region is mainly populated by Buddhists who traditionally spend
great amounts of financial resources on funeral arrangements. The costs for the
religious ceremony held at the temple and other funeral-related expenses usually
range between THB 50,000 and THB 100,000 (McCord and Tatin-Jaleran (2013))
which exceeds the average annual disposable income of households in the region.6
However, funeral expenses are to a large extent socially enforced. A failure in
keeping up with the tradition entails high social costs, i.e. families lose prestige
and respect among fellow villagers. Since the timing of death is unpredictable,
households highly value insurance products that mitigate the financial burden of
a funeral. To meet this need, based on traditional, informal insurance groups, the
6The average annual household income in our sample was THB 82,000 in 2008.
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Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) initiated the founda-
tion of large-scale, membership-based funeral aid associations (FAA) throughout
its branch network in 1980.7 Nearly 5.5 million people were member of one of the
521 FAAs that existed by the end of 2002 (Sompadung (2013)).
Insurance mechanism, premiums, and benefits. The key features of the
insurance scheme are the pay-as-you-go character, the uniform pricing strategy
(set according to the average community risk), and the resolution to provide full
insurance coverage (McCord and Tatin-Jaleran (2013)). FAAs follow a pay-as-you-
go system, where the total amount of benefits paid out in a given period is divided
by the number of FAA members. The resulting share of costs is the premium
each member has to pay in that period.8 The sum insured, i.e. the amount of
benefit paid out in the event of death, is usually THB 100,000 per person (which
is enough to cover the average funeral costs in the region).9 Some FAAs prefix
higher payments, yet within an FAA they are equal for all members. Hence, the
FAA premium is a linear function of the sum insured and a contribution parameter
which represents the average mortality risk in the community in a given period
(1.2 percent as of 2002). Most importantly, FAAs do not pursue any activities
related to risk management (e.g. screening, signaling, risk classification, etc.).
Comparability of FAAs. Our theoretical and empirical analyses are based
on the assumption that FAAs are comparable in the way they operate. In gen-
eral, FAAs are non-profit insurance associations which are independent and self-
organized. Yet, the BAAC acts as a promoter and supporter of FAAs by providing
office space for rent, guidance in administration and management, and payment
7The tradition of giving donations to the family of the deceased is deeply rooted in village
communities. In many villages, it led to the establishment of semi-formal burial societies  village-
based insurance groups which rely on the principle of mutual aid. For a detailed description of
a village-based burial society, see the study by Bryant and Prohmmo (2002).
8Further, all members share the administrative costs of the association equally.
9When a member passes away, the sum insured is paid out to pre-assigned beneficiaries
through the BAAC system. The decision how to utilize the compensation is left to the recipients.
Most importantly, the BAAC does not have any legal claims on the proceeds to cover outstanding
loan repayments. Most members honor their debts with the bank, though. Nevertheless, out of
the THB 6.7 billion which were paid out in 2002, only 18 percent were used for debt settlements
(Sompadung (2013)).
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services. Further, all BAAC-supported FAAs are based on the legal foundation of
the Funeral Association Act (initially issued in 1974, recent version of 2002) that
regulates the organizational structure and procedures, upper limits of administra-
tive fees, etc.10 Due to the technical assistance of the bank and the regulatory
framework, FAAs are quite comparable across the country. They might differ,
however, in the level of premiums (e.g. due to variation in administrative effi-
ciency), the number of members, and average member characteristics (e.g. the
mortality risk). While these differences across FAAs are of no concern for our
theoretical analysis (our conclusions are transferable across FAAs which vary in
the above characteristics), we have to take them into account when investigating
FAAs empirically, as described in more detail in Section 3.4.2.
Eligibility for membership. Our analyses further rely on the assumption that
membership in an FAA is voluntary and accessible for (almost) everybody. Mem-
bership in a funeral association is available, but not compulsory, for BAAC clients
(borrowers and depositors) and their spouse (McCord and Tatin-Jaleran (2013)).
Not being a BAAC customer, although formally required, is not a de facto re-
striction. BAAC clients are allowed to remain a member of an FAA when their
relationship with the bank ends. Anecdotal evidence suggests that individuals
that are not yet with the BAAC strategically open bank accounts or take out
small loans (a service practically available to any resident in rural areas) in or-
der to become eligible for FAA membership. In an official report the bank states
that for many people, FAA membership is more important than the loan itself
(Sompadung (2013)). Further, FAA membership is officially restricted to healthy
individuals between the age of 20 and 65 (McCord and Tatin-Jaleran (2013)).
Good health has to be certified by a physician, yet no in-depth health examina-
tions are necessary. In fact, only severely ill individuals are rejected when applying
for membership. To sum up, membership decisions are made voluntarily and ap-
plications are usually approved. The few supply-side restrictions  old age and
extreme illness  will be accounted for in our empirical analyses.
10See Sompadung (2013) and the Funeral Association Act, B.E. 2545 (2002) on
http://www.lawreform.go.th.
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3.3 Theoretical analysis
3.3.1 Determinants of membership decision
Individual i ∈ I will take out funeral insurance for period t + 1 if the expected
utility of insurance membership at time t is greater than the expected utility of
not being a member of an FAA:
EUi1,t > EUi0,t. (3.1)
In a simplified framework, individual i considers in period t the utility Ui of the
disposable income wi, and the loss L
d
i his dependents would experience in t + 1
if i should die. For the purpose of this framework, we define dependents as those
family members who would be most negatively affected by i's death and funeral,
e.g. i's spouse and children. The loss may reflect social costs, i.e. the family's
loss of reputation among fellow villagers if the funeral would fail to meet local
expectations. It may further materialize in the form of financial costs, e.g. the
total costs of emergency loans taken up at extreme interest rates in order to fund an
uninsured funeral. For simplicity, we assume that i's decision to join the insurance
is the only way for his dependents to be financially prepared for a funeral.
We adopt a standard framework for insurance demand, e.g. as in Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976). We modify it by adding a parameter that allows for heterogeneity
in insurance preferences unrelated to the individual risk type. If individual i is not
a member of the insurance, the expected utility can be expressed as
EUi0,t = (1− ri,t+1)Ui,t(wi,t) + ri,t+1Ui,t(wi,t − δi,tLdi,t+1), (3.2)
where ri,t+1 is the probability that i will pass away in period t + 1, with 0 ≤
ri,t+1 ≤ 1. Further, δi,t ≥ 0 is a weighting parameter which indicates how much
the family's loss Ldi,t+1 affects i's utility, and therefore his insurance decision in
t. δi,t is zero if i does not have any dependents, and greater than zero otherwise,
where δi,t = 1 indicates normal preferences for insurance and δi,t < (>)1 indicates
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low (high) preferences. The parameter allows for several interpretations. First,
it may reflect the bargaining power of i's dependents, i.e. the degree of pressure
the family may exert in order to convince i to take out insurance. Second, it
may be interpreted as the degree of cooperation within the household, reflecting,
for instance, reciprocity among family members with respect to insurance take-up.
Third, it may be interpreted as a bequest motive or as the degree of empathy-based
altruism that the individual harbors for his dependents. In all three cases δi,t may
depend on the degree of how much i's family cares about whether an appropriate
funeral is held or not. Finally, δi,t could also reflect the degree to which members
of the family serve as a substitute for insurance. For instance, the individual might
worry less about the loss of his dependents with increasing family size, as financial
costs would be borne by more relatives. For the rest of this paper we refer to δi,t
as the family-related preference for insurance.
If individual i is a member of the insurance, the expected utility can be expressed
as
EUi1,t = (1− ri,t+1)Ui,t(wi,t − ct) + ri,t+1Ui,t(wi,t − ct − δi,t(bdt+1 − Ldi,t+1)) (3.3)
where ct is the premium paid by i in period t in order to take out insurance
coverage for t+ 1, and bdt+1 is the benefit payment received by the dependents if i
passes away in t + 1. As described above, FAAs provide full insurance coverage.
We therefore assume that bdt+1 is equal to L
d
i,t+1. Hence, Equation (3.3) can be
expressed as
EUi1,t = Ui,t(wi,t − ct). (3.4)
From Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.4) we obtain the necessary condition for indi-
vidual i to join an FAA:
Ui,t(wi,t)− Ui,t(wi,t − ct)
Ui,t(wi,t)− Ui,t(wi,t − δi,tbdt+1)
< ri,t+1. (3.5)
Whether the above condition holds depends on the level of the family-related
preference for insurance, on the mortality risk and the shape of the utility function.
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If an individual does not have any dependents, i.e. δi,t = 0, EUi0,t is always greater
than EUi1,t. Hence, such an individual will never take out funeral insurance.
Conditional on having dependents, an increase in the mortality risk (e.g. due to
age or illness) or in the family-related preference for insurance would raise EUi1,t
relative to EUi0,t.
11 Finally, the more risk averse an individual is (i.e. the more
concave the utility function), the higher is his or her willingness to pay a risk
premium in order to gain certainty about the future (i.e. to avoid the possible loss
Ldi,t+1). Therefore, the probability to take out insurance should rise with increasing
individual risk aversion, ceteris paribus.
3.3.2 FAA budget constraint
An FAA insurance scheme is in a stable equilibrium, if the accumulated premiums
ct of all members i ∈ M(ct) are equal to or greater than total payments made to
beneficiaries in a particular period, i.e. the budget constraint of the insurance can
be expressed as
∑
i∈M(ct)
ri,t+1b
d
t+1 ≤
∑
i∈M(ct)
ct, (3.6)
where M(ct) is the set of members attracted to the insurance at a given premium
level ct. As b
d
t+1 is predetermined and fixed to the usual costs needed in order
to arrange a funeral, the balance of Equation (3.6) depends on the endogenous
relationship between the premium level ct and the average mortality risk r¯t+1 of
all members i ∈ M(ct).12 To meet the budget constraint, the average risk of all
members must satisfy the condition
r¯t+1 ≤ ct
bdt+1
. (3.7)
11In the most extreme case, individuals may choose to insure themselves just before death.
Many FAAs therefore couple eligibility for benefits to a minimum period of membership of a few
weeks or months.
12The endogeneity of the relationship arises because, on the one hand, FAAs set their premium
level according to the average mortality rate of their members (see the pay-as-you-go system,
described in Section (3.2)). On the other hand, the average mortality rate depends on the quality
of the risk pool attracted to the insurance at a given premium level.
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Note the sharp contrast of this budget constraint to the membership condition in
Equation (3.5).
3.3.3 Stability
From Equation (3.5) it is evident that individuals with
ri,t+1 >
ct
δi,tbdt+1
(3.8)
will join the insurance of whom those may threaten the stability of FAAs who
benefit financially from insurance membership, i.e. individuals with δi,t ≤ 1, and
therefore with
ri,t+1 >
ct
bdt+1
. (3.9)
For the purpose of the remaining analysis we define those individuals as high-
risk types. The selection of high-risk individuals into the insurance scheme may
threaten the financial stability if it is not counter-balanced by a sufficiently high
share of low-risk individuals who are willing to pay more than the actuarially fair
premium, i.e. individuals with
ri,t+1 <
ct
bdt+1
. (3.10)
More precisely, since r¯t+1 must be greater than the left-hand side of Equation (3.5)
divided by the number of insurance members |M(c)| (and given the fixed levels
of ct and b
d
t+1), we can combine Equation (3.5) and (3.7), and obtain the static
condition for insurance stability:
1
|M(c)|
∑
i∈M(c)
Ui,t(wi,t)− Ui,t(wi,t − ct)
Ui,t(wi,t)− Ui,t(wi,t − δi,tbdt+1)
<
ct
bdt+1
. (3.11)
Equation (3.11) conveys that stability is possible even though FAAs are particu-
larly attractive to high-risk individuals. Moreover, it becomes evident that pref-
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erences for insurance are crucial for the stability of the insurance. First, low-risk
individuals who demand insurance based on risk-averse preferences increase the
likelihood that Equation (3.11) holds. Second, and most importantly for the focus
of this paper, family-related preferences δi,t influence the left-hand side and, hence,
the likelihood that Equation (3.11) holds. If δi,t is greater than one, individuals
may be attracted to the insurance at low mortality-risk levels, and they may con-
tribute to stabilize the scheme (given the fixed premium level). We investigate this
further in our empirical analysis below by testing how the presence of a spouse or
children in a household accounts for insurance demand at lower risk levels.
In the above framework, we leave out any emotional cost the individual may di-
rectly face when knowing that he or she may pass away without a proper funeral.
Nevertheless, these feelings may play a role for insurance demand and for the sta-
bility of FAAs. However, our theoretical framework could be easily adjusted such
that Li,t+1 represents i's direct loss while δi,t would capture an intrinsic preference
for insurance, i.e. how much the individual cares about the funeral. The latter
could depend on the degree of reputational considerations, guilty feelings of break-
ing with religious traditions (both of which Buddhists may even care about beyond
death), or the pure feeling of sadness to end life without a proper celebration.
In an adjusted model of this kind the conclusions would essentially remain the
same: heterogeneous preferences (of whatever kind) play an important role for the
stability of funeral insurance schemes.
3.4 Empirical analysis
We use household panel data which is representative for rural households in North-
east Thailand. Our empirical strategy unfolds in three steps. First, we investigate
the selection into FAAs based on the individual risk type. Second, we demon-
strate that (low-risk) preference-based selection into FAAs coexists. Finally, we
show that the latter (partially) balances the former type of selection.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Total
(Mean)
Total
(SD)
Non-
member
(Mean)
Non-
member
(SD)
FAA-
member
(Mean)
FAA-
member
(SD)
Difference
(T-test)
Passed away between 2008 and 2013 0.062 (0.241) 0.061 (0.239) 0.065 (0.247) 0.004
FAA member in 2008 0.198 (0.398) 0.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 1.000
Age 49.072 (15.342) 47.518 (15.835) 55.374 (11.119) 7.856***
65 or older 0.171 (0.376) 0.162 (0.368) 0.206 (0.405) 0.044***
Male 0.460 (0.498) 0.444 (0.497) 0.523 (0.500) 0.079***
Can read and write 0.920 (0.271) 0.918 (0.274) 0.926 (0.261) 0.008
Illness 0.248 (0.432) 0.230 (0.421) 0.319 (0.466) 0.089***
Severe illness 0.024 (0.153) 0.023 (0.150) 0.028 (0.165) 0.005
Subjective health: feels healthy 0.604 (0.489) 0.627 (0.484) 0.511 (0.500) -0.117***
Subjective health: can manage 0.245 (0.430) 0.231 (0.422) 0.303 (0.460) 0.071***
Subjective health: feels sick 0.150 (0.357) 0.141 (0.348) 0.187 (0.390) 0.045***
Marital status: Married 0.792 (0.406) 0.769 (0.422) 0.886 (0.318) 0.117***
Marital status: Widow 0.090 (0.286) 0.089 (0.285) 0.092 (0.289) 0.003
Marital status: Divorced 0.022 (0.146) 0.026 (0.158) 0.007 (0.085) -0.018***
Marital status: Never married 0.097 (0.296) 0.117 (0.321) 0.015 (0.120) -0.103***
Household wealth, quartile 1 (top) 0.250 (0.433) 0.266 (0.442) 0.185 (0.389) -0.080***
Household wealth, quartile 2 0.241 (0.428) 0.265 (0.441) 0.147 (0.354) -0.118***
Household wealth, quartile 3 0.251 (0.434) 0.242 (0.428) 0.289 (0.454) 0.047***
Household wealth, quartile 4 (lowest) 0.257 (0.437) 0.228 (0.419) 0.378 (0.485) 0.151***
Travel time to BAAC (in minutes) 24.883 (13.508) 25.007 (13.766) 24.381 (12.398) -0.626
Household has car/motorcycle 0.869 (0.337) 0.867 (0.340) 0.879 (0.327) 0.012
N 4876 - 3914 - 962 - -
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3.4.1 Data
We use data from a household panel survey which comprises 2113 households, in-
cluding 4876 individuals at age 20 or older.13,14 The data set features information
on individual demographics, and on the wealth and finances of households. Sum-
mary statistics are provided in Table 3.1. 20 percent of individuals in our sample
were a member of an FAA in 2008. In the subsequent five years, 6.2 percent of
individuals passed away. The mortality rate does not differ significantly between
members (6.5 percent) and non-members (6.1 percent). FAA members are older,
and they are more often male and married. Moreover, FAA members suffer more
often from severe illness or feel sick, and they are richer compared to non-members.
3.4.2 Method
In order to investigate the selection based on the risk type and family-related
preferences, and the balance between the two, we adopt two methods from the
literature on conventional insurance markets.
Testing for risk-type and preference-based selection. For the first series of
tests, we follow Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) and estimate two probit models:
Pr(Died = 1) = Φ(Xβ1 + β2Z), (3.12)
Pr(Insured = 1) = Φ(Xα1 + α2Z). (3.13)
13The survey was carried out as part of the project Impact of shocks on the vulnerability to
poverty  consequences for the development of emerging Southeast Asian economies (FOR 756,
German Research Foundation). A three-stage cluster sampling strategy was applied, selecting
two villages from each of the 49 subdistricts which are representative for the rural population
of three predetermined provinces in Northeastern Thailand in 2007. In each of the 98 sample
villages, ten households were randomly selected. Households were followed over four subsequent
survey waves (2007, 2008, 2010, and 2013). For a detailed description on the sampling strategy,
see Hardeweg et al. (2013a).
14We exclude individuals at age 19 or younger in 2008 from our sample, as the minimum age
for FAA membership is 20.
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Died is a binary variable which is equal to one for individuals who passed away
between 2008 and 2013, and zero otherwise. Insured is a binary variable which
is equal to one for members of a funeral association in 2008, and zero for non-
members. Further, X is a vector of confounding characteristics described in more
detail below. The explanatory variables of interest are the characteristics Z. In
order to test for potential drivers of selection, we add one characteristic at a time
to both equations. This approach allows to observe whether a characteristic that
captures (private) information on the risk type or on preferences drives both the
mortality and demand for insurance.
First, we use this approach in order to test for selection based on the risk type. A
positive and significant coefficient β2 in Equation (3.12) would indicate that the
respective characteristic Z is a driver of mortality. In case α2 in Equation (3.13)
is also positive and significant, Z is also a driver of insurance demand. Thus, in
such a situation, individuals may base their insurance decision on the (private)
information about their risk type implied by the particular characteristic, i.e. this
would be a strong indication for selection based on the risk type.
Second, we use this approach in order to test for selection based on family-related
preferences. In this opposite case, we test whether a characteristic is negatively
correlated with mortality (β2<0), and positively correlated with insurance mem-
bership (α2>0). Thus, in such a situation, the insurance decision of an individual
would be based on the (private) information about the preference for insurance
which is captured by the particular characteristic, i.e. this would be a strong
indication for preference-based selection.
Balance of both types of selection. The second approach we adopt is the
classical positive correlation test. We use it to test whether the average mortality
risk is balanced across FAA members and non-members.15 In other words, the test
provides evidence whether the selection patterns of high- and low-risk individuals
investigated in the first series of tests, as described above, (partly) off-set each
15The test was initially suggested by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) and has traditionally been
used to elicit whether insurance coverage and the ex-post realization of the insured risk are
(conditionally) independent. We use a slightly different version of the test which was, for instance,
suggested by He (2009), and which is more intuitive for our purpose.
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other. We therefore estimate the following probit model
Pr(Insured = 1) = Φ(Xγ1 + γ2Died). (3.14)
The estimate of interest is the coefficient γ2. If γ2 is positive and significant, it
would indicate that overall FAA membership is associated with a higher mortality
rate  a sign of unbalanced selection of high-risk types. This could be due to
asymmetric information or information that was observed by the insurance but
neglected, i.e. not used for insurance pricing.16 If γ2 is close to zero and insignif-
icant, in turn, such a hypothesis would be rejected. By adding characteristics
that were identified as drivers of risk-type or preference-based selection, we gain
knowledge of their importance for maintaining the balance between the selection
patterns and, hence, for the stability of the insurance.
Basic and alternative specifications. Both approaches described above are
usually performed conditional on a set of known characteristics X which insurance
companies use for the classification of risks and the pricing of insurance contracts.
As mentioned above, FAAs charge a uniform price and, thus, refrain from any
kind of risk classification. In our basic specification, we therefore do not include
any control variables. However, premium levels of FAAs are subject to community
risk-rating, i.e. they are set according to the average mortality rate in a district
 the administrative unit an FAA usually operates in. Also, the administrative
efficiency may vary across FAAs. Hence, while equal within one particular FAA,
the price for insurance might differ between FAAs. In order to allow for diverse
premium levels across districts, we estimate a second specification where we include
district dummies. This ensures that our estimates do not capture the variation in
16By neglected information we mean asymmetrically used rather than asymmetrically dis-
tributed information, i.e. individual demographic characteristics the funeral association observes
(based on the registration form) but does not use for risk-rating. The term asymmetrically used
information was coined by Finkelstein and Poterba (2014). The authors found that insurers in
the UK annuity market did not use certain known characteristics of policy holders for setting
insurance premiums, although those characteristics were correlated with subsequent claims and
insurance demand. They emphasize that disregarding this information in the process of under-
writing created market inefficiencies similar to those that arise when holders of annuities have
private information about their mortality risk.
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insurance demand that is due to district level characteristics, e.g. differences in
the average mortality rate or in administrative costs.
FAAs may reject applicants based on personal characteristics (e.g. severe illness or
old age). Moreover, demand for FAA membership might be affected by transaction
costs or individual restrictions such as mobility, literacy, or the distance to the
nearest FAA office (usually located in the neighborhood of a BAAC branch). The
average travel time to the nearest BAAC office is 25 minutes for individuals in our
sample. A total of 13 percent of individuals live in households that do not own a car
or motorcycle and, therefore, might have a harder time reaching an FAA. Moreover,
8 percent of individuals in our sample are illiterate and would depend on help when
filling in the application form.17 Yet, none of these characteristics are significantly
different when we compare FAA members and non-members applying a t-test
(see Table 3.1 above). This suggests that the characteristics mentioned above
do not restrict access to FAAs. Nevertheless, we verify our results by providing
additional estimations of specifications in which we control for characteristics that
may (potentially) restrict FAA membership.
3.4.3 Measures
In order to test for selection based on the risk type, we focus on three characteristics
which are commonly used by providers of health- and mortality-related insurance
products in order to classify risks: age, health, and gender.18 Our data set does
not provide detailed information on illness. It includes, however, self-reported
statements about how healthy a person feels (healthy, can manage, or sick)
and information about whether a person reports to suffer from illness in 2008.19
17However, application forms are kept simple. They consist of one or two pages asking for the
name, date of birth, age, nationality, name of the spouse, and contact information.
18See, e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) for the long-term care insurance market in the
US, Finkelstein and Poterba (2014) for the annuity market in the UK, and He (2009) for the life
insurance market in the US.
19Suffering from illness may or may not increase the mortality risk, depending on how fatal a
disease is. Moreover, the actual mortality risk of a disease might depend on the overall health
condition of an individual. We make use of both health measures as they may complement each
other in a favorable way. The health measures are reported for all members of household by the
household head.
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Together, these measures proxy (private) information about the mortality risk in a
very condensed way. If our health measures (partly) predict mortality, they should
serve as adequate proxies to test for selection based on the risk type. In order to
capture family-related motives to take out insurance, we use individuals' marital
status which has been frequently applied by studies on bequest motives and life
insurance demand.20 Moreover, we consider the number of children in a household.
Finally, we control for household wealth measured as the total asset value owned
by a household, net of total loans owed.
3.4.4 Results
In this section, we report results of our empirical analyses in three steps. Using
the first test described in Section 3.4.2, we first document selection based on the
risk type. In a second step, we use the same test to investigate preference-based
selection. Finally, we examine the overall balance of mortality across members and
non-members of the insurance using the second test described in Section 3.4.2, and
we investigate how the previously identified drivers of selection affect this balance.
Selection based on the risk type
Table 3.2 reports estimates of marginal effects of the probit models in Equa-
tion (3.12) and (3.13). In Panel A, we add each characteristic separately to the
equations. Each cell reports the estimate from a separate regression. As expected,
the older an individual is in 2008, the more likely he or she passes away between
2008 and 2013. A ten-year increase in age raises the probability to pass away
by four percentage points (see Column (1)). More importantly, older people are
also more likely to be a member of an FAA in 2008. As demonstrated by the
estimates in Column (2), a ten-year increase in age raises the probability to take
out insurance by five percentage points. Unsurprisingly, individuals who report to
suffer from illness in 2008 are also more likely to die in the subsequent five years.
The same seems to be true for those who report to feel sick. The less healthy an
20See, e.g., Liebenberg et al. (2012), Bernheim (1991), and Sauter (2012).
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individual feels in 2008, the more likely he or she passes away between 2008 and
2013 (odd columns). At the same time, suffering from illness or not feeling healthy
(irrespective of the intensity) is related to a higher probability of having insurance
in 2008 (even columns). Finally, the mortality rate of men is significantly higher
relative to women in our sample (odd columns). This finding is confirmed by a
United Nations study which demonstrates that the life expectancy of Thai women
is three years longer compared to men at age 60 (UN DESA (2012)). Most impor-
tantly, men are also significantly more likely to be a member of an FAA in 2008
(even columns).21 These results suggest that private or neglected information on
the mortality risk, derived from age, health and gender, may translate into greater
insurance demand.
Overall, the size and significance of our estimates remain largely unchanged when
we control for differences in FAA characteristics by including district dummies
in the specification (see Column (3) and (4)). Yet when we further add those
characteristics which may restrict FAA membership (Column (5) and (6)), the re-
sults demonstrate a notable change in the size of the correlation between age and
insurance membership (upwards), and between our health measures and ex-post
mortality (downwards).22 Even in this conservative specification, the coefficients
remain robust and quantitatively meaningful. However, when we include our mea-
sures of age, gender and health in one specification (see Panel B), it turns out that
21This finding could be due to different levels of disposable income of men and women in
a household. However, we cannot test whether income differentials play a role for insurance
demand, as we do not have information on individual income. Sauter (2012) controls for reallo-
cation motives within the household using the income differential between men and women. He
finds that before the German reunification, women in East Germany were more likely to have life
insurance relative to men. Previous studies, which did not control for different levels of income,
found opposite effects. Gandolfi and Miners (1996) report that in 1984, women in the US were
less likely to have insurance compared to men. Moreover, Chen et al. (2001) provide evidence
for gender-specific differences in life cycle effects. They find larger age effects on life insurance
demand for men relative to women. However, the authors attribute their findings mainly to the
different roles men and women traditionally played in the family.
22These changes in the size of the coefficients are most likely due to the inclusion of two binary
variables which indicate the age of 65 and above, and suffering from severe illness (in 2008).
Both characteristics could have caused rejections from FAA membership in 2008. The change in
the age coefficient suggests that applicants at the age of 65 or older are indeed rejected, and that
the relation between age and insurance membership is underestimated when we do not control
for old age. The change in the health coefficients suggests that the indicator variable for severe
illness captures indeed the incidence of fatal diseases.
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age and gender are the drivers of selection based on the risk type, as the health
coefficients decrease in size and become (partly) insignificant.
In summary, the first key finding of our empirical analysis is that high-risk indi-
viduals are more likely to select into FAAs as predicted by our theoretical analysis.
The results in Table 3.2 provide clear evidence of private or insurance-neglected
information on risk types which is positively related to insurance demand. As
this selection of high-risk individuals is not reflected in insurance pricing, it may
have adverse effects on the stability of FAAs if it is not counter-balanced by a
sufficiently high share of low-risk types.
Preference-related selection
In order to investigate selection based on family-related preferences, we again es-
timate Equation (3.12) and (3.13). We include binary variables which indicate
whether an individual is married, separated/divorced or widow. Individuals who
have never been married serve as the reference category. Further, we include the
number of children (below the age of 20) in a household in a separate specifica-
tion. As the spouse and children would probably be most severely affected by an
uninsured funeral, we expect married individuals and those with children to be
more likely to take out insurance (in line with our theoretical predictions). All
specifications additionally control for age, health and gender. Results are reported
in Table 3.3. The estimates of our baseline specification demonstrate that married
individuals are less likely to pass away within the subsequent five years relative
to those who never married (Column (1)). Consistent with our theoretical pre-
dictions, married individuals are more likely to take out insurance (Column (2))
relative to those in the reference category. This is the second major finding of our
study: Despite their relatively low mortality risk, our results suggest that mar-
ried individuals are more likely to take out insurance. We argue that this finding
could be due to family-related preferences for insurance (i.e. δi,t > 1). We, thus,
interpret the results as empirical support for our theoretical predictions.23 The
23Our findings are in line with previous results in the literature. Liebenberg et al. (2012), for
instance, conduct a dynamic analysis of the demand for whole life insurance, and they provide
evidence that being (newly) married is positively related to insurance take-up. Bernheim (1991)
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reported associations remain largely unchanged when we control for the wealth of
households, differences across FAAs and (potential) membership-restricting char-
acteristics (see Columns (7) to (12)).
We do not find evidence for similar selection patterns when using the number
of children in a household as proxy for family-related preferences (Column (3)
and (4)). However, in this case, the relation to insurance demand is less clear.
Parents might want to protect their children from the negative consequences of an
unexpected funeral, but their willingness to pay for insurance might also decrease
in the number of children, as financial costs would be borne by more relatives.
In fact, there is some evidence that individuals with more children are less likely
to take out insurance (even columns). Interestingly, having more children is also
associated with a higher mortality risk (odd columns). However, the coefficients are
very small and insignificant in most specifications (or only marginally significant).
Stability
In a final step, we investigate the stability of FAAs and analyze how it is affected
by the selection patterns detected above. Table 3.4 presents the relation between
mortality and insurance membership estimated from Equation (3.14). The coef-
ficient on mortality is close to zero and insignificant (Columns (1) to (3)) which
indicates that overall the probability of being a member of the insurance is not
significantly different for high-risk individuals and low-risk types, i.e. on average
the mortality rate does not differ between members and non-members of FAAs.
This implies that both demand patterns, i.e. the selection based on risk types (see
Table 3.2) and insurance preferences (see Table 3.3), balance each other out, so
that FAA insurance schemes are in a stable equilibrium.
In order to demonstrate the magnitude of this balancing effect, we subsequently
finds a negative relationship between being widow and having insurance which he attributes to
the conversion of the insurance to cash when a spouse passes away. Further, the author finds
a positive relation between being single and having insurance which he attributes to a strategic
bequest motive, i.e. the promise of bequest in return for taking care of the policy holder in
the old age. Sauter (2012) finds no relation between individuals' marital status and insurance
demand. He argues, however, that his findings are due to the strong role of the welfare state in
pre-unified East Germany.
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Table 3.4: Correlation between mortality risk and FAA
membership controlling for drivers of risk-type and
preference-based selection
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Coefficient from probit regression of 0.011 0.008 -0.012 -0.062** -0.054** -0.052**
Insured (2008) on Died (2008 - 2013) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
District dummies x x x x x x
Restricting characteristics x x x x x
Age x x x x
Illness x x x x
Subjective health x x x x
Male x x x x
Marital status x x x
Number of children x x
Household wealth x
Notes: Sample is limited to individuals who are at least 20 years old. The table reports marginal
effects from probit regression of Insured (2008) on Died (2008 - 2013), heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at the household level in parentheses. Died
(2008 - 2013) indicates whether an individual passed away during the period of 2008 to 2013.
Insured (2008) indicates FAA membership in 2008. Models in Columns (2) to (6) include district
dummies. Columns (3) to (6) control for restricting characteristics (Severe illness, Can read and
write, Travel time to next BAAC branch, Household owns car or motorbike, and Age is 65 or
older). Models (4) to (6) add risk-type related characteristics (Age, Illness, Subjective health,
and Male). Models (5) and (6) subsequently add the set of dummies indicating Marital status,
Number of children in the household and Household wealth quartiles. ***, **, * denote statistical
significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. Means of Died (2008
- 2013) and Insured (2008) are 0.06 and 0.20, respectively.
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add the drivers of both types of selection to Equation (3.14). First, we control
for the drivers of selection based on the risk type. Our estimates reveal a sig-
nificant negative correlation between FAA membership and mortality (Column
(4)). Thus, within a group of individuals who are equal in terms of age, gender
and health, those with a lower residual mortality risk are more likely to self-select
into the insurance. When we additionally control for individuals' marital status,
the correlation (i.e. the conditional relationship between mortality and insurance
membership) is somewhat closer to zero (Column (5)). We interpret this finding
as empirical evidence that family-related preferences positively affect the balance
of the selection patterns and, hence, the stability of FAAs. However, a large share
of this balancing effect remains unexplained, as indicated by the negative and sig-
nificant coefficient on mortality. Thus, our findings suggest that further low-risk
individuals might be willing to pay more for the insurance than the actuarially
fair premium. Such a high willingness to pay for insurance could be due to an
additional, unobserved type of preference. As suggested by our theoretical pre-
dictions, this preference could be based on risk aversion. Finally, as indicated by
the results in Section 3.4.4, the number of children in a household does not play a
quantitatively meaningful role for the stability of FAAs (Column (6)).
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we show theoretically and empirically that high-risk individuals
(i.e. older people and men) are more likely to be a member of a funeral aid
association (FAA) in Northeast Thailand compared to low-risk types. In a simple
theoretical framework, we demonstrate that family-related preferences may result
in additional insurance demand of low-risk individuals which could consolidate
the stability of the scheme. In fact, our empirical analyses provide evidence that
married individuals are more likely to be a member of an FAA, and that they
are less likely to pass away during the period of observation. In line with these
findings, we show that on average the mortality rate does not differ significantly
between members and non-members of the scheme. However, married individuals
can only partly counterbalance the demand of high-risk types. Thus, our findings
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suggest that further low-risk individuals might be willing to pay more than the
actuarially fair premium. This could be due to an additional but unobserved type
of preference for the insurance.
We assume that due to the balance between the different patterns of selection,
insurance premiums could settle down at reasonable levels which resulted in large
numbers of members. However this stabilizing cross-subsidization of high-risk
members by low-risk types raises concerns about the future financial stability of
FAAs. For instance, it is easily conceivable that low-risk individuals may have
joined FAAs due to a lack of alternative providers of risk-rated insurance policies.
Once alternative providers offer funeral insurance at a risk-rated premium, low-
risk individuals would have an incentive to switch providers. Such a shift of low-
risk members out of FAAs would result in a sharp increase in premium levels
and possibly in a continuous decline in the number of members. This dynamic
may eventually cause the collapse of the scheme which is known as the adverse
selection death spiral.24 It might, therefore, be advisable for FAAs to consider
the implementation of risk-rated premiums.
Finally, we address the question of why risk-rating is not common among FAAs
although it may contribute to the long-term stability of the scheme. On the one
hand, exact underwriting on cohort-based death probabilities might be inapplica-
ble due to the additional costs. On the other hand, a simple linear pricing scheme
based on applicants' age and gender could be feasible even in very small insurance
associations. As we demonstrate in the empirical analysis, gender and age seem
to be the drivers of the high-risk selection, and they are, thus, the most relevant
characteristics for risk-rating. For a basic but informative risk classification of (po-
tential) FAA members it may therefore be adequate to consider only applicants'
age and gender. However, raising the price for insurance contingent on age might
be difficult to implement since respect for the elderly is a crucial part of Thai
culture. Finally, political economy explanations could also be at play. Insurance
committees often consist of elderly men, and they may therefore lack incentives to
raise the price for insurance along the above mentioned dimensions.
24For real-life examples of adverse selection death spirals, see e.g. Cutler and Zeckhauser
(1998) and Butler (2002).
Chapter 4
The impact of the social pension on
child outcomes in rural Thailand‡
4.1 Introduction
As in most of the developed world, population aging is a growing challenge for
societies and policy makers in many developing and emerging countries. In these
regions, informal employment is often very common and most people lack formal
protection against poverty in the old age. In order to provide a basic income to
the elderly, social pension schemes are becoming an increasingly popular policy
instrument. Empirical evidence suggests that such policies have been successful
in increasing the wellbeing of the elderly, e.g. by facilitating a reduction in labor
supply at earlier ages, especially for men (Carvalho Filho (2008), Kaushal (2014),
Juarez and Pfutze (2015), Galiani et al. (2016)), and by enhancing mental health
and nutritional intake (Galiani et al. (2016), Salinas-Rodríguez et al. (2014)).
In order to assess the overall effect of a pension scheme, however, taking into
account family members other than the pensioner is crucial. In fact, the empirical
literature on the impact of social pensions goes beyond considering the wellbeing
of pensioners. For instance, pension eligibility of an elderly may allow prime-
age adults to migrate in order to find (better) employment (Posel et al. (2006),
‡Joint work with Attakrit Leckcivilize and Juliane Zenker. This research was funded by
the German Research Foundation in its Research Training Group RTG 1723 Globalization and
Development and its Research Unit FOR 756. The authors thank participants of the RTG 1723
Workshop for valuable comments and suggestions.
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Ardington et al. (2009)), and it may allow migrants to reduce transfers made
to those pensioners who were left behind, especially if households are very poor
(Jensen (2003), Maitra and Ray (2003), Fan (2010), Juarez (2009)).
In this study, we add to the literature by investigating the effect of a social pen-
sion on child outcomes in rural Thailand  more precisely on school enrollment
and child work. We exploit the pension reform in 2009 in order to estimate the
impact of an exogenous increase in income of the elderly. Previous studies have
shown that children may benefit from pension eligibility of co-residing grandpar-
ents. Duflo (2003) demonstrates for the South African social pension that children
experience better nutrition and health due to the pension eligibility of co-residing
elderly. However, the effect is limited to girls who live with an eligible grand-
mother. Edmonds (2006) finds further evidence for the South African pension
to improve schooling and reduce hours worked, especially for boys in households
with pension-eligible men. The changes due to male eligibility seem to result in
levels of schooling and work which are similar to those of children living with an
elderly women close to qualifying age. Edmonds (2006) argues that households,
and especially men, might be credit constrained because the pension scheme was
already in place at the time the survey was conducted, i.e. the cash transfer was
anticipated.
This study is more closely related to the work by Ponczek (2011) and Carvalho Filho
(2012) who exploit a pension reform in order to estimate the impact of a social
pension on child outcomes in Brazil. As a result of the reform, eligibility was
expanded to more than one person per household, the minimum qualifying age
was lowered, and benefits were scaled up to the level of minimum wage. Using
the same data but different empirical strategies and age cohorts, the authors show
that school attendance increases for girls who live with beneficiaries of the reform,
i.e. elderly who became eligible or receive greater transfers after the reform26.
Whereas Carvalho Filho (2012) finds no evidence for differential effects with re-
spect to the gender of the beneficiary, the estimates by Ponczek (2011) demonstrate
that schooling improves only for girls who co-reside with a male beneficiary. Child
26To be precise, both authors draw on the same household data, but Ponczek (2011) uses two
additional survey waves.
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work is only investigated by Carvalho Filho (2012). He shows that when bene-
ficiaries of the reform are female, girls tend to work less (yet there is also weak
evidence for girls to work more when beneficiaries are male).
This study differs notably from the work by Ponczek (2011) and Carvalho Filho
(2012) owing to the distinct history and characteristics of the social pension scheme
in Thailand and its implications for the empirical analysis. Unlike in Brazil, before
the reform in 2009 the social pension in Thailand was designed to target only the
poorest elderly. In the wake of the reform, coverage was expanded to all elderly
in the country. As households in the region of our study are generally poor, the
change from targeting to universal coverage made elderly eligible for pension who
are mostly poor, yet not among the very poorest. We argue that this setting allows
to identify an effect of the social pension on child outcomes although the amount
of pension guaranteed by the scheme is very small. As newly-eligible elderly are
not extremely poor, it is reasonable to assume that their most basic needs are met
which may allow them to invest the extra income in their grandchildren.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to show that already a very
small amount of pension can have a large and significant impact on child outcomes,
i.e. on school enrollment and the employment status. Pension schemes studied so
far guarantee benefits of at least moderate size, and some are even very generous.
Most of the empirical literature on the impact of social pensions draws on data
from South Africa. The South African social pension scheme has been studied
at length, partly because of the highly generous benefits it guarantees (about
twice the median per capita income of African households). More recently, there
is a growing literature addressing pension schemes in Latin America and Asia.
As mentioned above, the social pension in Brazil provides another example of a
generous scheme27. In contrast, pension schemes in Mexico and Taiwan guarantee
benefits of rather moderate size (corresponding to about 30% of the average income
of eligible individuals28).
27Carvalho Filho (2012) notes that pension payments correspond to about 16% of total income
of mature households, i.e. households with eligible or almost eligible members.
28In the case of Mexico, separate pension schemes were set up in Mexico city and rural Mex-
ico, however both guarantee benefits of similar relative size. For additional information on the
Mexican pension schemes, see Juarez (2009) and Juarez and Pfutze (2015). Fan (2010) provides
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In this study, we conduct an analysis similar to difference-in-differences. Similar
to the study by Ponczek (2011), we compare children who live with newly-eligible
pensioners (i.e. beneficiaries of the reform) to children in similar but unaffected
households before and after the reform29. To make both groups comparable, we
restrict our sample to children in households with members of three generations.
Thereby, we make sure that children in the control group live with at least one
member that will soon qualify for pension, and we make sure that households
in both groups are of comparable structure. In addition to children living in
households without pension-eligible elderly, our control group includes children in
households with elderly who received pension payments already before the reform.
We cannot distiguish the latter from all other households in the empirical analysis
because pre-reform eligibility criteria were not precise enough. Our results demon-
strate that due to the reform, school enrollment improves, and work is reduced, for
children who live with newly-eligible pensioners. In line with the existing litera-
ture, we find strong evidence for gender effects, i.e. for male (female) pensioners to
favor boys (girls). The positive impact on school enrollment seems to be limited to
boys who co-reside with newly-eligible men (or men and women), whereas the neg-
ative impact on the employment status seems to be limited to girls in households
with female beneficiaries. We substantiate our findings further by demonstrating
that pension income translates into greater spending on education, and we show
that this additional investment in children's education is driven only by the pres-
ence of male pensioners. Finally, we provide additional empirical evidence which
demonstrates that the above effects are due to the pension reform, and we show
that the behavioral response of households receiving pension payments already
before the reform was substantially different as they were poorer.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we give a brief
overview of the history and characteristics of the social pension scheme in Thailand.
We describe the data in Section 4.3 and the empirical strategy in Section 4.4. Our
additional information on the social pension scheme in Taiwan. The relative size of pension ben-
efits, i.e. the share of household income, is not explicitly reported by Fan (2010) but information
on absolute values is given. Based on this information, we calculate the share reported here.
29However, in contrast to Ponczek (2011), we use pension eligibility to instrument for pension
receipt, as was done for instance by Duflo (2003) and Carvalho Filho (2012). Moreover, we use
panel data in the analyses which contrasts to most of the previous studies.
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main results are presented in Section 4.5, and results of robustness analyses are
given in Section 4.6. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.7.
4.2 The universal pension scheme
In 2009, the Government of Thailand initiated a policy reform which made public
pension available to all elderly in the country. Since the implementation of the
universal pension scheme in October 2009, all Thai at age 60 or older have been
eligible for the program - except for those who live in a public retirement home or
receive any other government pension (e.g. former civil servants)30. The scheme is
non-contributory, yet registration is required in order to receive pension payments.
The size of benefits was initially set to 500 Baht which corresponds to two or three
median daily wages. In October 2011, the level of benefits was further increased
and set to vary by the age of beneficiaries. The minimum monthly payment was
raised to 600 Baht for individuals at age 60 to 69, and benefits for individuals at
age 70 to 79, 80 to 89, and 90 or older were set to 700 Baht, 800 Baht, and 1000
Baht, respectively.
The universal pension scheme replaced a means-tested program which was de-
signed to provide financial assistance only to the poorest elderly. It fell short on
adequately targeting the elderly poor as coverage was perceived to be insufficient
and unfair (Jitsuchon et al. (2012)). Figure 4.1 depicts the trend in the number of
beneficiaries and the corresponding government expenditures before and after the
reform31. In 2008, the year before the reform, approximately 1.8 million elderly
were registered under the targeted program. In 2010, the first post-reform year,
about 5.7 million beneficiaries were reported to receive pension payments. Due
to administrative problems, coverage was still incomplete in 2010, and only about
70% of the eligible population was registered (Jitsuchon et al. (2012)). Finally,
in 2013 most elderly who qualified for pension were reported to receive benefits
(about 7.3 million).
30Those restrictions, however, do not influence our analyses since elderly in the region studied
usually live alone or with their families. Moreover, the share of households with elderly members
who receive any other government pension is below 1% in our sample.
31The data is provided by the National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand.
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4.3 Data
We use panel data from a household survey which was conducted in 2007, 2008,
2010 and 2013 by members of the research unit FOR 756, and funded by the
German Research Foundation32. The data is representative for the rural popu-
lation of three provinces in Northeast Thailand and covers 2136 households. It
includes child-level information on education and the employment status, as well
as detailed household-level information, e.g. on income, expenditures, and social
security transfers. We restrict our sample to children at age 6 to 18 in 2008 who
live in households with three generations. Thereby, our sample covers all children
who were of official primary or secondary school age in 200833. We use data on
1220 children and 748 households.
In order to estimate the impact of the social pension on school enrollment, we
use a binary variable which is equal to one if a child is reported to be enrolled
in school or any other educational institution, and zero otherwise. In order to
measure the employment status of a child, we construct another binary variable
based on information on the (main or second) occupation. It is equal to one if a
child is reported to perform any full- or part-time work, and zero otherwise34.
Table 4.1 shows the trend in school enrollment and the employment status of chil-
dren before and after the reform. The table presents the share of children (in %)
who are reported to be enrolled in school or to perform any kind of work, respec-
32For detailed information on the survey and the sampling procedure, see Hardeweg et al.
(2013b). We use data from 2013, since in 2010 the pension reform might not have taken its full
effect. Most importantly, the time span from October 2009, when the universal pension was first
in place, to April 2010, when data collection started, is rather short. Implementation problems
seem to be less severe in the region studied since about 85% of eligible elderly were reported to
receive pension benefits already in 2010.
33Officially, children in Thailand should attend primary school at age 6 to 11 and secondary
school at age 12 to 17. However, late enrollment is very common, especially in the region studied,
and most children enter primary school at age 7 (UNICEF (2014)).
34This includes children who are reported to be engaged in own agriculture or related activities
(e.g. fishing), to run a (family-owned) business, to be engaged in any (casual or permanent) off-
farm agriculture or non-agriculture, to be a housewife or to serve in the army. Since housewives in
our sample are typically married, the decision to work might be very different in that particular
case. However, whether we include housewives in our definition of work does not change the
results.
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tively. Numbers are given separately for children in beneficiary households and
for those in the control group, as well as for boys relative to girls. Overall, school
enrollment is decreasing over time as children get older and drop out of school.
However, the trend is somewhat weaker for children in beneficiary households, and
for girls relative to boys. In contrast, the share of children who perform any kind
of work is increasing over time; again, the trend seems to be weaker for children
in beneficiary households, and for girls relative to boys.
4.4 Methodology
To verify our hypothesis that already a small amount of public pension could
affect outcomes of children in a household, we follow a standard practice in the
literature, such as in Duflo (2003), and restrict our sample to households with three
generations, i.e. grandparents, parents and children. Since the introduction of the
universal social pension policy in 2009 and the increase in amount of social pension
in 2012 were exogenous policy changes beyond the influence of households, we
employ an identification strategy similar to difference-in-differences and formulate
an empirical model for educational choice and the decision to work for children as
follows:
yit = β0 +X
′
itβ1 + β2Pensionit +Dt + eit (4.1)
where yit is the dependent variable which can be a binary variable for the enroll-
ment or employment status of child i at time t. Xit is a vector of child and house-
hold characteristics. The child characteristics include age, age-squared and gender
while the household characteristics include the number of household members in
predefined gender-age groups35, household income, the size of land owned by the
household in 2008 and years of education of the head of household. Pensionit is a
binary variable for the pension status. It is equal to 1 if child i stays in a household
35The gender-age groups are categorized by gender and age groups for each five-year interval
starting from 0-4, 5-9, ... , 55-59, 60-64 to 65-69, continuing with ten-year intervals for 70-79
and 80-89, and finally 90 years old onwards.
CHAPTER 4. IMPACT OF SOCIAL PENSION ON CHILD OUTCOMES 71
reporting to receive public pension in period t. Lastly, Dt are time dummies for
the post-reform periods (2010 and 2013) and eit are the error terms.
However, the enrollment and employment status of children in households who
receive public pension could be differently influenced by unobservable characteris-
tics from households who do not; for example, they might be better connected to
local politicians who make decisions regarding the allocation of the public pension,
especially before the pension scheme became universal. Even after the reform, se-
niors in better connected households might be more likely to register to receive
pension than less connected counterparts. To circumvent this endogeneity con-
cern, we exploit the change in the reform in 2009 that made everyone older than
60 eligible to claim for the pension regardless of their level of income. We then
replace the dummy variable for the actual pension status in Equation 4.1 with a
dummy variable based on the age of members in the household after the reform
(PenAge) and specify the following model:
yit = δ0 +X
′
itδ1 + δ2PenAgeit + δ3PenAge70it
+δ4PenAge80it + δ5PenAge90it +Dt + it
(4.2)
Specifically, PenAgeit is equal to one if there are some members of household
who are at least 60 years old in 2010 or 2013, and zero otherwise. In addition,
we account for the increase in pension benefits in 2013 by including additional
dummy variables for households with members' age 70-79 (PenAge70it), 80-89
(PenAge80it) and 90 or older (PenAge90it) in 2013. Since our model controls for
the number of household members in different age-groups by gender (particularly,
those at age 55-59 who were almost eligible for pension, and those at age 60-64 who
just became eligible) as well as the common time effects for each period after the
reform, the estimated coefficient of PenAgeit would capture an intent-to-treat ef-
fect of the universal pension scheme on children's outcomes by comparing children
in households with eligible members (treatment) to children in households with
almost eligible members (control). Another specification in this paper is based on
instrumental variable regressions using PenAgeit, PenAge70it, PenAge80it and
PenAge90it as instruments for the pension status (Pensionit). Thus, the regres-
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sion in Equation 4.2 can be viewed as a reduced form of the IV estimation. Our
first stage regression is the following:
Pensionit = α0 +X
′
itα1 + α2PenAgeit + α3PenAge70it
+α4PenAge80it + α5PenAge90it +Dt + ut
(4.3)
Lastly, the impact of the social pension could differ by the gender of the child and
the pensioner in a household due to differential preferences of grandmothers and
grandfathers towards girls and boys or unequal bargaining power among pension-
ers within the same household (Ponczek (2011)). Hence, we add gender-specific
pension variables to the model in Equation 4.1  PenFit (a dummy variable equal
to one for households with female pensioner(s)) and PenMFit (a dummy variable
equal to one for households with male and female pensioners). We then estimate
the model in separate regressions for boys and girls in the household. Our new
second stage regression is modeled as follows:
yit = θ0 +X
′
itθ1 + θ2Pensionit + θ3PenFit + θ4PenMFit +Dt + νit (4.4)
where yit, Xit and Dt are the same as in Equation 4.1, and νit are the error
terms. As for the first stage of this specification, we generate two dummy variables
for households with newly-eligible female, or male and female members, respec-
tively (i.e. members who are at least 60 years old in 2010 or 2013). Together
with PenAgeit, we use them as instrumental variables for Pensionit, PenFit and
PenMFit. PenFit and PenMFit, thus, estimate the difference in the effect of the
pension policy on children's outcomes if a household has female, or male and female
pensioners, respectively, relative to the effect when there are only male pensioners
in the household. Finally, we classify the pension dummy (Pensionit) in three
categories in order to estimate individual effects by the gender of the pensioner
(in contrast to measuring the difference in the effects as described above). We
generate two dummy variables for households with only female, or only male
pensioner(s), respectively, and another binary variable for households with both
female and male pensioners. Moreover, we generate three dummy variables for
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households with only female, only male, or both male and female members
who became eligible for pension in 2010 or 2013 (i.e. who are at least 60 years old
in 2010 or 2013). We use them as instrumental variables in the first stage of this
specification. Standard errors of all regressions in this paper are clustered at the
village level36.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 School enrollment
In this section, we report estimates of the impact of the universal pension on school
enrollment of children in our sample. Table 4.2 presents results of the reduced-form
(Columns (1)-(3)) and IV estimation (Columns (4)-(6)). We estimate the impact
on school enrollment in separate regressions for children at age 6-18, 6-11 and 12-
18 in 2008. Overall, pension eligibility of a member of household does not relate to
a change in the probability of being enrolled in school for children in our sample,
as the coefficient on Eligible HH (variable PenAge) is insignificant and close to
zero (Column (1)). The same is true for children among the younger cohort (age
6-11), though this is not surprising, because even in 2013 most of them were still at
an age when enrollment was almost complete already before the reform. However,
pension eligibility has a positive and significant impact on school enrollment of
children among the older cohort. When living with a post-reform eligible pensioner,
these children are almost 20 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school
compared to those in the control group (see the coefficient on Pension HH, i.e.
variable Pension, in Column (6)). We interpret our finding such that on average
children at age 12-18 (in 2008) who live in households that benefit from the reform
drop out of school at older ages. Comparing the coefficients in Columns (3) and
(6) reveals that pension take-up is incomplete. Yet our instruments are powerful
predictors of pension receipt, as the first-stage F-statistics exceed the critical value
by far in most of the estimations, including those below.
36Our main results do not change if we employ White-adjusted standard errors instead.
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4.5.2 Employment status
Next, we investigate the impact of the universal pension on the employment status
of children in our sample. Results are presented in Table 4.3. As before, we report
reduced-form (Columns (1)-(3)) and IV estimates (Columns (4)-(6)), separately
for the younger and older cohort, and for all children in our sample. Overall,
pension eligibility of a member of household is associated with a decrease in the
probability that a child works, as the coefficient on Eligible HH is negative and
significant (Column (1)). The same is true for children among the older cohort, yet
not for younger children, i.e. the overall result seems to be driven by older children
in our sample. When living with a post-reform eligible pensioner, older children
are more than 20 percentage points less likely to work, relative to children in the
control group (Column (6)). We interpret our findings such that those children
either stop working (e.g. in the case of part-time labor), or that they do not take
up work in the first place. As for school enrollment, it is no surprise that we do
not find an effect for younger children, since even in 2013, most of them were still
at an age when full- or part-time work was very uncommon already before the
reform.
4.5.3 Gender analyses
Given the above findings, we investigate in a next step the presence of gender effects
such that male or female pensioners would favor either boys or girls in the house-
hold in their schooling or work decision. Such gender-specific changes may indicate
different preferences or bargaining power within the household, as demonstrated
e.g. by Ponczek (2011). We therefore run further analyses, separately for boys
and girls in our sample, and include additional gender-specific pension (eligibility)
variables to the first- and second-stage regressions, as described in Section 4.4.
School enrollment. IV estimates of the impact of the universal pension on school
enrollment are given in Tabel 4.4 for boys and girls, respectively, in odd and even
columns. As before, we estimate the impact in separate regressions for the younger
and older cohort, and for all children in our sample. In line with the above findings,
the universal pension has neither an effect on school enrollment of boys or girls
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in the younger cohort, nor on all boys or girls in our sample, regardless of the
gender of the pensioner. Our results further demonstrate that school enrollment
improves only for older boys who live with post-reform eligible male, or male and
female beneficiaries of the reform. Older boys who live with a male (or male and
female) pensioner(s) are about 40 (30) percentage points more likely to be enrolled
in school compared to those in the control group (Column (5)). When only female
beneficiaries are present in a household, however, the coefficient is smaller and
insignificant. In contrast to boys, school enrollment of girls at age 12-18 is not
affected by the universal pension, irrespective of the gender of the pensioner(s), as
none of the coefficients on the pension variables is significantly different from zero.
Since before the reform, enrollment rates of girls were generally higher compared
to boys in our sample (i.e. girls seemed to drop out of school at later ages), we
interpret our findings such that male beneficiaries might support boys in catching
up with girls in terms of schooling.
Child work. Next, we investigate the impact of the universal pension on children's
employment status by the gender of the child and the pensioner. IV estimates
are presented in Table 4.5 which is set up just as Table 4.4. In contrast to school
enrollment, the employment status of boys is not affected by the universal pension,
irrespective of the gender of the pensioner. However, our findings are very different
for girls. Overall, girls are significantly less likely to work when living with a newly-
eligible female pensioner  a finding which seems to be driven by older girls in our
sample. For them, the probability to work full- or part-time is 25 percentage points
lower compared to girls in the control group (Column (6)). Yet, when male (or
male and female) pensioners are present in a household, we do not find such an
effect as the coefficients on the pension variables are all insignificant.
4.5.4 Expenditure analyses
In order to substantiate the above findings, we analyze in a next step whether
households adjust their education expenditure in response to the universal pen-
sion. We therefore use data at the household level, restricted to three-generation
households with children at age 6-18 in 2008. IV estimates are reported in Table 4.6
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for the overall effect (Column (1) and (2)), and by the gender of the pensioner (Col-
umn (3) and (4)). We measure education expenditure using the natural logarithm
(odd columns) and the share of total expenditures (even columns). Overall, our
results provide some (albeit weak) evidence that households with beneficiaries of
the reform increase their education expenditure. The universal pension is associ-
ated with higher education expenditure both in absolute and relative terms, yet
only the latter is marginally significant. Households with a post-reform eligible
pensioner raise the share they spend on education relative to total expenditures
by 3 percentage points (see Column (2)). As for school enrollment, the change in
education expenditure seems to be mostly due to the presence of male pensioners
in the household. The latter is associated with an increase in education expendi-
ture by 123 percentage points (see Column (3)). This increase in the total amount
invested in children's education corresponds to a rise in relative expenditure by
almost 5 percentage points.
Finally, we estimate the above relations for the expenditure categories food, non-
food and health, and for total expenditures, using the same measures as before.
Results are presented in Table 4.7. None of the coefficients on Pension HH is
statistically significant, independent from the measure used. Households do not
seem to adjust their expenditure on any of the above categories (neither in absolute
nor in relative terms)  except for education.
4.6 Robustness Analyses
4.6.1 Alternative outcome variables
As part of the robustness analyses, we estimate further regressions in order to
demonstrate that our main findings remain largely unchanged when using alter-
native measures of schooling and employment. We therefore generate a binary
variable that indicates whether a child is a student37. We construct further binary
variables by excluding either domestic chores, or domestic chores and work in the
37As for the employment status, we use information on children's main or second occupation
in order to construct the variable.
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family farm or business (i.e. off-farm employment only) from our definition of the
employment status. Results are presented in Table 4.8, again separately for the
younger and older cohort, and for all children in our sample. Each cell presents
the estimate from a separate regression of Pension HH on the dependent variable
indicated in the first column. Neither the size nor the significance of the coeffi-
cients change much relative to our main findings in Section 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 when
using alternative measures of schooling and employment.
4.6.2 Alternative sample restrictions
Since the effect of the universal pension on the enrollment and employment status
is most pronounced for children at age 12 to 18 (in 2008), we demonstrate in a
next step that our findings are robust to alternative definitions of the age cohort.
Specifically, we estimate the impact of the universal pension on school enrollment
and the employment status of children at age 12 to 17 and 12 to 19 (in 2008).
Results are presented in Column (1) and (2) of Table 4.9. As before, each cell
presents the estimate from a separate regression of PensionHH on the dependent
variable indicated in the first column. Our main findings from Section 4.5.1 and
4.5.2 are robust to alternative cohort definitions, as the size and significance of the
coefficients remain largely unchanged. Finally, we conduct further analyses where
we restrict our sample to households with oldest members at age 50 to 70. Thereby,
we compare children in households which are even more similar relative to those in
our main analyses. Results for the younger and older cohort, and for all children
in our sample are presented in Columns (3)-(5) of Table 4.9. The estimates of
our main analyses are again largely robust to alternative sample definitions. The
coefficients are of similar size and still marginally significant.
4.6.3 Placebo analyses
In a final step, we demonstrate that the changes in the enrollment and employment
status of children described above are due to the reform of the social pension
scheme in Thailand. In particular, we show that households with pensioners under
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the targeted scheme (before the reform) were poorer and responded differently
to the extra pension income compared to households with beneficiaries of the
universal scheme (after the reform). Households with pensioners before the reform
were indeed significantly poorer compared to all other households, i.e. it seems
that the targeting of the poorest elderly under the previous system was (to some
extent) successful. Median annual per capita income of households with targeted
elderly was 784 US$ in 2008, compared to 1021 US$ for all other households.
Next, we conduct several placebo analyses in order to investigate whether the
presence of a pensioner in the household before the reform (under the targeted
scheme) relates to children's enrollment or employment status, or to education
expenditures of the household. As before, we provide IV estimates of the models
described in Section 4.4 (for the overall effect), however we only use pre-reform
data from 2007 and 200838. Results for the analyses at the child level (i.e. for
the dependent variables enrollment and employment status) are presented in
Table 4.10, separately for the different age cohorts. The presence of a newly-
eligible pensioner in the household before the reform seems to be unrelated to the
enrollment and employment status of children, independent from their age. In
Column (5), the coefficient on PensionHH is marginally significant, however the
second-stage F-statistic is only 0.18, i.e. jointly the coefficients are not significant.
Results of the expenditure analyses are presented in Table 4.11. In line with the
findings from Table 4.10, the presence of a newly-eligible pensioner in the house-
hold before the reform seems to be unrelated to education expenditure. Moreover,
households do not seem to adjust their expenditures on any of the categories (nei-
ther in absolute nor in relative terms) except for their expenditures on health.
More precisely, households with pensioners under the targeted scheme raise their
health expenditures by more than 100 percentage points relative to all other house-
holds. Again, this finding seems to be in line with the above results. Since most
households with pensioners under the targeted scheme were very poor, it is reason-
able to assume that they chose to use the extra pension income in order to cover
their most basic needs, i.e. to invest it in their members' health.
38We cannot identify eligible individuals in the placebo analyses because pre-reform qualifica-
tion criteria were not very precise. Yet age is a reasonable approximation as demonstrated by
the size of the first-stage F-statistics reported below.
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4.7 Conclusion
The reform of the social pension scheme in Thailand made public pension available
to all elderly in the country. The expansion from targeted to universal coverage
allows to investigate the impact of exogenous pension payments on the enrollment
and employment status of grandchildren of moderately poor pensioners. Our esti-
mates suggest that children benefit to a great extent from the pension income of
their grandparents, yet there are considerable differences with respect to the gen-
der of the child and the pensioner. For boys, the probability of being enrolled in
school increases significantly when living with a post-reform eligible male (or male
and female) pensioner(s). In contrast, girls are less likely to work full- or part-time
when beneficiaries are female. We do not find evidence for similar effects on school
enrollment of girls or the employment status of boys. In line with previous studies
(e.g. by Ponczek (2011)), we argue that our findings could be due to differential
preferences of grandmothers and grandfathers towards girls and boys or unequal
bargaining power among pensioners within the same household.
Although we argue that our findings are due to the distinct history and charac-
teristics of the social pension scheme in Thailand, their implications are of general
importance, particularly with regard to the design of pension policies (or even cash
transfers in general). More precisely, we contribute to the discussion on the trade-
off between the targeting of public policies to specific individuals (or households)
and the universal provision of such policies. For instance, targeted policies might
be more difficult to implement, as individuals (or households) must be identified
and reached. The latter might be particularly difficult to achieve in rural and re-
mote areas, i.e. especially when targeting the poor. On the other hand, targeting
might be more efficient as it may allow for smaller financial budgets compared
to universal policies. For instance, in the case of the social pension in Thailand,
the budget increased dramatically from 10.6 billion in 2008 (targeted) to 58.3 bil-
lion (universal). However, as we show in this study, such arguments might ignore
important effects on individuals who do not belong to a policy's target group.
Such effects could be easily overlooked in particular if they were not part of a
policy's initial intention or primary objective. Further research is needed to get a
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more comprehensive understanding of the impact of targeted relative to universal
policies in order to better gauge their trade-off.
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Figure 4.1: Number of beneficiaries of the social pension scheme and
corresponding size of government budget in Thailand, 1993-2013.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics:
School enrollment and employment
status (in %)
Before reform After reform
2008 2010 2013
Panel A: Enrollment
Children with newly eligible elderly 81.8 82.3 64.1
Children in control group 79.3 77.0 58.0
All boys 79.0 76.3 58.3
All girls 81.7 82.0 62.6
Panel B: Employment status
Children with newly eligible elderly 9.2 13.5 28.5
Children in control group 9.7 19.7 34.7
All boys 11.0 19.7 35.0
All girls 8.1 14.5 29.2
Note: School enrollment and employment status of children aged
6 to 18 in 2008.
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Table 4.2: The impact of the social pension on
school enrollment: OLS and 2SLS
Reduced form 2SLS
6-18 6-11 12-18 6-18 6-11 12-18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eligible HH 0.021 -0.021 0.089** - - -
(0.023) (0.025) (0.035)
Pension HH - - - 0.041 -0.045 0.186**
(0.052) (0.055) (0.075)
Girl 0.046** 0.020 0.058* 0.046** 0.020 0.055*
(0.019) (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029)
Age 0.222*** 0.527*** -0.067* 0.222*** 0.527*** -0.061*
(0.011) (0.030) (0.035) (0.011) (0.030) (0.036)
Age2 -0.009*** -0.022*** -0.001 -0.009*** -0.022*** -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Total HH income 0.036*** 0.011 0.054*** 0.036*** 0.012 0.056***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012)
Land area in 2008 0.004** 0.000 0.008*** 0.004** 0.000 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Education of HH head 0.006* 0.004 0.010* 0.007** 0.003 0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
F-statistic 1st stage - - - 46.6 38.4 34.5
R2 0.361 0.363 0.364 0.360 0.361 0.347
Observations 3387 1570 1817 3387 1570 1817
Control variables
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Note: The sample is limited to children living in households where three or more gen-
erations were present in 2008. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. All
models control for Household composition, i.e. the number of male and female house-
hold members in separate age groups 0-4, 5-9 ... 65-69,70-79, 80-89 and 90+. Pension
HH indicates whether a household member receives the pension after becoming eligible
due to the reform.
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Table 4.3: The impact of the social pension on
employment status: OLS and 2SLS
Reduced form 2SLS
6-18 6-11 12-18 6-18 6-11 12-18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eligible HH -0.062*** -0.024 -0.105*** - - -
(0.023) (0.022) (0.035)
Pension HH - - - -0.136*** -0.047 -0.226***
(0.051) (0.049) (0.075)
Girl -0.041*** -0.025** -0.052* -0.041*** -0.025** -0.049*
(0.016) (0.012) (0.027) (0.015) (0.012) (0.027)
Age -0.095*** -0.020 0.019 -0.095*** -0.019 0.012
(0.008) (0.014) (0.035) (0.008) (0.014) (0.036)
Age2 0.005*** 0.001* 0.002** 0.005*** 0.001* 0.003**
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Total HH income -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.031** -0.027*** -0.016*** -0.033***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012)
Land area in 2008 -0.002 0.003* -0.006** -0.001 0.003* -0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Education of HH head -0.005* -0.002 -0.010* -0.008** -0.003 -0.013**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006)
F-statistic 1st stage - - - 46.6 38.4 34.5
R2 0.381 0.067 0.341 0.364 0.055 0.309
Observations 3387 1570 1817 3387 1570 1817
Control variables
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Note: The sample is limited to children living in households where three or more gen-
erations were present in 2008. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. All
models control for Household composition, i.e. the number of male and female house-
hold members in separate age groups 0-4, 5-9 ... 65-69,70-79, 80-89 and 90+. Pension
HH indicates whether a household member receives the pension after becoming eligible
due to the reform.
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Table 4.4: The impact of the social pension on
school enrollment by gender: 2SLS
6-18 6-11 12-18
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Recipient 0.178 -0.002 -0.066 -0.219 0.404** 0.174
(0.127) (0.150) (0.159) (0.165) (0.167) (0.247)
∆FemaleRecipient -0.153 0.035 0.017 0.226 -0.256 -0.047
(0.163) (0.169) (0.170) (0.210) (0.240) (0.261)
∆Male + FemaleRecipient 0.107 -0.105 0.004 -0.136 0.152 -0.091
(0.102) (0.096) (0.120) (0.124) (0.140) (0.140)
F-statistic 1st stage 36.7 21.5 8.9 11.4 20.1 10.0
R2 0.355 0.378 0.395 0.374 0.314 0.382
Observations 1662 1723 793 775 869 948
Control variables
Child and family variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female Recipient 0.023 0.033 -0.049 0.010 0.142 0.126
(0.103) (0.068) (0.099) (0.087) (0.162) (0.096)
Male + Female Recipient 0.129 -0.072 -0.044 -0.125 0.295** 0.035
(0.104) (0.089) (0.136) (0.103) (0.142) (0.135)
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note: The sample is limited to children living in households where three
or more generations were present in 2008. Standard errors are clustered at
the village level. All models control for individual and household charac-
teristics reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, as well as for Household composi-
tion, i.e. the number of male and female household members in separate
age groups 0-4, 5-9 ... 65-69,70-79, 80-89 and 90+. Male (Female / Male
+ Female) Recipient indicates whether a male (female / male and female)
household member receives the pension after becoming eligible due to the re-
form. ∆Female(Male+Female)Recipient measures the additional effect if a
women (men and women) receives the pension after becoming eligible due to
the reform compared to a men (the individual effects of a men and woman).
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Table 4.5: The impact of the social pension on
employment status by gender: 2SLS
6-18 6-11 12-18
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male Recipient -0.154 -0.069 -0.138 0.063 -0.219 -0.187
(0.111) (0.145) (0.120) (0.139) (0.151) (0.247)
∆FemaleRecipient 0.015 -0.104 0.058 -0.140 0.002 -0.068
(0.140) (0.169) (0.134) (0.173) (0.210) (0.280)
∆Male + FemaleRecipient -0.000 0.070 -0.097 0.015 0.037 0.107
(0.093) (0.085) (0.095) (0.085) (0.134) (0.138)
F-statistic 1st stage 36.7 21.5 8.9 11.4 20.1 10.0
R2 0.388 0.345 0.077 0.060 0.333 0.303
Observations 1662 1723 793 775 869 948
Control variables
Child and family variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female Recipient -0.137 -0.173** -0.079 -0.078 -0.214 -0.255***
(0.104) (0.067) (0.103) (0.071) (0.157) (0.096)
Male + Female Recipient -0.136 -0.103 -0.174 -0.063 -0.178 -0.148
(0.100) (0.070) (0.113) (0.060) (0.144) (0.118)
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note: The sample is limited to children living in households where three or more
generations were present in 2008. Standard errors are clustered at the village
level. All models control for individual and household characteristics reported
in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, as well as for Household composition, i.e. the number
of male and female household members in separate age groups 0-4, 5-9 ... 65-
69,70-79, 80-89 and 90+. Male (Female / Male + Female) Recipient indicates
whether a male (female / male and female) household member receives the pension
after becoming eligible due to the reform. ∆Female(Male + Female)Recipient
measures the additional effect if a women (men and women) receives the pension
after becoming eligible due to the reform compared to a men (the individual effects
of a men and woman).
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Table 4.6: The impact of the social
pension on education expenditure:
overall and by gender of pensioner
Log Share Log Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pension HH 0.619 0.030* - -
(0.396) (0.017)
Male Recipient - - 1.230* 0.049*
(0.738) (0.028)
HH income (lagged) 0.281*** 0.001 0.267*** 0.001
(0.087) (0.003) (0.088) (0.003)
Land area in 2008 0.050*** 0.000 0.050*** 0.000
(0.012) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001)
Education of HH head 0.082*** 0.002** 0.082*** 0.002**
(0.031) (0.001) (0.031) (0.001)
∆FemaleRecipient - - -1.029 -0.033
(0.862) (0.033)
∆Male + FemaleRecipient - - 0.168 0.011
(0.519) (0.019)
F-statistic 1st stage 56 56 28 28
R2 0.165 0.082 0.164 0.081
Observations 2121 2121 2120 2120
Control variables
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes
Female Recipient 0.193 0.016
(0.474) (0.020)
Male + Female Recipient 0.354 0.026
(0.527) (0.022)
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level
respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note: The sample is limited to households with children aged
6 to 18 where three or more generations were present in 2008.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. All models
control for Household composition, i.e. the number of male and
female household members in separate age groups 0-4, 20-24 ...
65-69,70-79, 80-89 and 90+ and binary variables indicating the
presence of a child of age 5, 6 ... 18 and 19 separately for boys
and girls. Male (Female / Male + Female) Recipient indicates
whether a male (female / male and female) household member
receives the pension after becoming eligible due to the reform.
∆Female(Male + Female)Recipient measures the additional ef-
fect if a women (men and women) receives the pension after be-
coming eligible due to the reform compared to a men (the individ-
ual effects of a men and woman).
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Table 4.7: The impact of the social pension on other expenditure
categories
Total (Log) Food (Log) Food (Share) Non food (Log) Non food (Share) Health (Log) Health(Share)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Pension HH -0.127 -0.106 0.001 -0.177 -0.032 -0.341 -0.004
(0.101) (0.098) (0.028) (0.139) (0.028) (0.375) (0.005)
HH income (lagged) 0.194*** 0.155*** -0.020*** 0.253*** 0.020*** 0.075 -0.000
(0.019) (0.019) (0.006) (0.026) (0.005) (0.078) (0.001)
Land area in 2008 0.021*** 0.018** -0.001 0.025*** 0.001 0.019 -0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.014) (0.000)
Education of HH head 0.040*** 0.025*** -0.006*** 0.051*** 0.004** 0.054** 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.024) (0.000)
F-statistic 1st stage 56 56 56 56 56 56 56
R2 0.252 0.261 0.153 0.179 0.086 0.040 0.034
Observations 2121 2121 2121 2121 2121 2121 2121
Control variables
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note: The sample is limited to households with children aged 6 to 18 where three or more generations were present in 2008.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. All models control for Household composition, i.e. the number of male and
female household members in separate age groups 0-4, 20-24 ... 65-69,70-79, 80-89 and 90+ and binary variables indicating the
presence of a child of age 5, 6 ... 18 and 19 separately for boys and girls. Pension HH indicates whether a household member
receives the pension after becoming eligible due to the reform.
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Table 4.8: 2SLS estimation of the
impact of the social pension on
child outcomes: alternative
outcome measures
6-18 6-11 12-18
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3)
Student 0.058 -0.044 0.203***
(0.054) (0.057) (0.075)
Child work -0.127*** -0.061 -0.194***
(Outside HH farm/business) (0.046) (0.038) (0.071)
Observations 3387 1570 1817
Control variables
Child and family variables Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Household composition Yes Yes Yes
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Note: The sample is limited to children living in house-
holds where three or more generations were present in 2008.
Standard errors are clustered at the village level. All mod-
els control for individual and household characteristics re-
ported in 3.2, as well as for Household composition, i.e. the
number of male and female household members in separate
age groups 0-4, 5-9 ... 65-69,70-79, 80-89 and 90+. Each
cell reports estimates of Pension HH in separate regres-
sions, where Pension HH indicates whether a household
member receives the pension after becoming eligible due to
the reform.
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Table 4.9: 2SLS estimation of the impact of the
social pension on child outcomes: alternative
sample restrictions
Alternative cohort definition HH with oldest member 50-70
12-17 12-19 6-18 6-11 12-18
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
School enrollment 0.191** 0.144** 0.107 0.023 0.197*
(0.082) (0.070) (0.070) (0.081) (0.105)
Child work -0.234*** -0.186*** -0.120* -0.071 -0.177*
(0.083) (0.072) (0.068) (0.073) (0.103)
Observations 1584 2041 1923 979 944
Control variables
Child and family variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household composition Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Note: The sample is limited to children living in households where three or more genera-
tions were present in 2008. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. All models
control for individual and household characteristics reported in 3.2, as well as for year
dummies and the number of male and female household members in separate age groups
0-4, 5-9 ... 65-69,70-79, 80-89 and 90+. Each cell reports estimates of Pension HH in
separate regressions, where Pension HH indicates whether a household member receives
the pension after becoming eligible due to the reform.
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Table 4.10: Placebo analyses: School enrollment
and employment status
Enrollment Employment status
6-18 6-11 12-18 6-18 6-11 12-18
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pension HH -0.022 -0.017 -0.008 0.066 0.047* 0.112
(0.065) (0.073) (0.098) (0.055) (0.026) (0.107)
Girl 0.016 -0.009 0.039 -0.017 -0.007 -0.024
(0.023) (0.022) (0.040) (0.017) (0.007) (0.035)
Age 0.310*** 0.529*** 0.280*** -0.124*** 0.005 -0.279***
(0.023) (0.108) (0.085) (0.015) (0.008) (0.090)
Age2 -0.014*** -0.025*** -0.012*** 0.007*** -0.000 0.012***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003)
Total HH income 0.035*** 0.005 0.054*** -0.014 0.004 -0.025
(0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.011) (0.004) (0.020)
Land area in 2007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
Education of HH head 0.003 0.004 0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006)
F-statistic 1st stage 93.8 58.7 71.8 92.0 59.2 71.0
R2 0.343 0.358 0.376 0.333 -0.005 0.311
Observations 2085 1000 1085 2098 1020 1078
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Note: The sample is limited to children living in households where three or more
generations were present in 2007. Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
All models control for Household composition, i.e. the number of male and female
household members in separate age groups 0-4, 5-9 ... 65-69,70-79, 80-89 and 90+.
Pension HH indicates whether a household member receives the pension after be-
coming eligible before the reform.
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